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Introduction 
1.   Education and training have a significant impact on output growth and individual welfare 
(OECD, 1994, 1999a, 2001). Although early childhood education must remain a policy priority to foster 
growth in the long-run, in 10-15 years from now, the bulk of the labour force will be still represented by 
individuals who are currently in the labour market. The education and training they receive after having 
started their working life is therefore crucial for output growth as well as individual career prospects.  
2.  There is a lively debate, however, concerning whether the current level of investment in training 
is adequate. Furthermore, past research has shown that training opportunities are unequally distributed 
across workers, with workers who are already in a better position in the labour market having more 
opportunities to acquire new skills. To remedy these problems, policy innovations – intended to improve 
training outcomes – have been experimented in OECD countries in recent years. Nevertheless, some 
implementation problems have sometimes accompanied the introduction of these innovations, usually 
because the factors behind inadequate training outcomes have not been addressed properly. The purpose of 
this paper is therefore twofold: a) to identify the reasons behind possible under-provision of training and 
inequality of outcomes; and b) to discuss policy approaches, by mapping each policy instrument into the 
potential problems it can address.  
3.  The empirical analysis of this paper focuses on employer-sponsored continuous vocational 
training (CVT) – i.e. that firms provide or pay for, at least partially. This is done for two reasons. On the 
one hand, CVT accounts for the largest share of education and training of the adult workforce in all OECD 
countries. On the other hand, CVT is closely related to the labour market and therefore must be analysed 
separately from the market for formal education. 
4.  The first section of the paper provides further evidence of inequality in training participation and 
intensity across different labour market groups. The second section looks at the evidence of under-
provision of training, as well as at the determinants of uneven training incidence. It also presents 
econometric evidence of training supply and demand effects for different groups. The last section draws 
some final conclusions. 
                                                      
∗.   This paper draws heavily from work done by the authors for the 2003 edition of the Employment Outlook. 
Wooseok Ok was an OECD Economist when he worked on this paper. Nevertheless, the opinions 










































1.  Continuous vocational training in OECD countries: a closer look at the data. 
5.  According to the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS),
1 there is substantial cross-country 
variation in the incidence and intensity of employer-sponsored CVT courses (that is formal CVT that firms 
provide or pay for, at least partially).
2 Training intensity and participation rates are greatest in the Nordic 
countries, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and lowest in a number of European countries (Table 1). 
On average, 26% of employed persons participate in employer-sponsored CVT each year with an annual 
training intensity of 18 hours per employee, i.e. equivalent to two and a half working days. These figures 
imply that, on average, each participant receives about 68 hours of training per year, that is slightly less 
than nine working days. The country with the highest CVT intensity per employee (as well as the highest 
participation rate) is Denmark where employees receive on average 36  hours per year of employer-
sponsored CVT, which translates into 81 hours per participant per year or about two working weeks. 
6.  Other studies have highlighted the fact that training provision is unequal across demographic and 
socio-economic groups (e.g. OECD, 1999b, and Ok and Tergeist, 2002). CVT may have the perverse effect 
of increasing inequalities between different worker groups if those already having greater earnings or 
employment security receive more training. Chart  1 shows the incidence and intensity of employer-
sponsored CVT by gender and age. There does not appear to be any significant difference in participation 
rates by gender. Nevertheless there is a clear gender-training gap in terms of intensity, with women 
receiving on average 17% fewer hours of training than men. 
7.  The incidence of training tends to decline with age. In particular, the average training 
participation rate of workers aged 56 to 65 years is about three-quarter of that of prime-aged workers (aged 
36 to 45  years). The participation profile is flatter at younger ages. However, the inverse correlation 
between age and training is more clear-cut when measured in terms of training intensity. On average, 
workers aged 56 to 65 years receive 12 hours of CVT courses per year, against 18 hours for workers aged 
35 to 45 years and 21 hours for workers aged 26 to 35 years. 
8.  Likewise, training participation and intensity differ considerably across educational and 
occupational groups (Chart  2). Participation in low-skilled occupations (13%) is about one third of 
participation in high-skilled occupations (38%). A similar pattern is found between different educational 
groups (16% for workers with less than upper secondary education against 35% for those having a tertiary 
degree). The rise in training rates with skill-intensity and educational attainment is particularly steep in 
Belgium (Flanders), Poland, Hungary and Italy (see Annex 2). 
9.  The worker’s position in the hierarchical ladder has an impact on his/her training opportunities. 
Chart 2 also shows that employees with a high degree of supervisory responsibility are twice as likely to 
participate in employer-sponsored training as are employees without any supervisory role. This pattern is 
more pronounced in terms of training intensity: on average, employees performing non-supervisory 
functions spend less than one-third as much time on training as employees with great supervisory role. 
Training incidence is also particularly low in the case of self-employed.  
                                                      
1.  Unless otherwise specified, all the data in this paper are from the IALS. Data refer to 1994 for Canada, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and the United 
States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom and to 1998 
for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of 
Switzerland. Country rankings as well as discrepancies with the data reported in Table 2 for European 
countries can be partially ascribed to cross-country differences in the survey years and must be interpreted 
with great caution. 
2.  Due to the lack of cross-country comparable data on informal training, the analysis of this paper will focus 
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10.  As shown in Chart 2, immigrants are somewhat less likely to participate in employer-sponsored 
CVT than natives, but the difference is not large (about 5 percentage points).
3 Immigrants also receive 
fewer hours of training on average (16 hours per employee per year, which corresponds to 86% of the 
training intensity of native workers). However, immigrants receive more employer-sponsored training than 
natives in Canada and Italy, as well as in the Netherlands (participation rates only) and Australia (training 
intensity only; see Annex 2). 
11.  Finally, data on training rates in large and small firms from the European Continuous Vocational 
Training Survey (CVTS) show that workers in small firms receive less employer-sponsored training than 
workers in large firms (Table 2).
4 Except in a few countries (e.g. Ireland and the United Kingdom), this gap 
is even greater when training intensity is taken into account: workers in large firms receive almost twice as 
many hours of employer-sponsored training as workers in small firms.  
12.  Bivariate correlations cannot provide a full snapshot of employer-sponsored training provision 
across OECD countries. To the extent that certain characteristics are correlated (for instance, occupation, 
education and supervisory role), certain patterns of inequalities in training outcomes might be spurious. In 
order to correct for such biases, a multivariate analysis has been carried over. The resulting estimates (see 
Annex 2) seem to broadly confirm the qualitative patterns of inequality discussed above. For example, the 
probability of receiving employer-sponsored training is estimated to be on average 6 percentage points 
smaller for immigrants than for natives, and 9 percentage points smaller for workers with less than upper 
secondary education than for individuals with a tertiary qualification. Furthermore, the overall conclusion 
remains that important differences in training participation and intensity exist between OECD countries, 
even after adjusting for a considerable number of characteristics of both workers and their employers. 
2.  A closer look at the determinants of unequal access to training 
13.  The above section identifies patterns of unequal training provision across different worker 
groups. This section examines the source of the inequality and whether the observed patterns are optimal in 
terms of economic efficiency. More specifically, Section 2.A reviews the empirical evidence on the extent 
to which various market failures affect training outcomes. However, although their impact differs across 
worker groups, these market failures do not explain training gaps entirely. For instance, training provision 
might increase with educational attainment simply because it is more profitable for a firm to train high-
educated workers or because high-educated workers are more ready to participate in training courses, due 
to greater rates of return. Anyway, the effectiveness of each policy instrument intended to improve training 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups will depend on the source of training inequalities – that is, whether 
training gaps are due to employers’ or employees’ behaviours. For this reason, the analysis carried over in 
Sections 2.B and 2.C tries to identify how employers’ supply and employees’ demand vary across worker 
groups. Implications for policy-making are then derived in the conclusions. 
                                                      
3.  Note, however, that language courses are included in the CVT measure. 
4.  There are several reasons why data from the CVTS are more suitable than IALS data for the analysis of 
training incidence by firm size: (i) employers know better about firm size and employer-sponsored training 
than employees; (ii) employer-provided CVT courses are more precisely defined in the CVTS; and (iii) 
intensity figures from the CVTS are more precise (while the IALS is likely to underestimate training 
intensity, see Annex 2). IALS data are used, instead of the CVTS, in the other tables, because the latter 










































A.  Market failures affecting training outcomes 
14.  In order to understand the incentives of individual workers and employers to invest in human 
capital, it is important to make a distinction between firm-specific and general training: 
•  In principle, the optimal amount of investment in firm-specific human capital – i.e. those 
skills that are valuable only at the firm providing them – can be obtained only if costs and 
returns can be shared by the worker and the firm (Becker, 1975, Hashimoto, 1981). Sharing is 
required for two reasons: i) this investment creates rents to continuing a relationship, which 
the parties can bargain over; and ii) although specific training is valued only at the firm that 
provides it – meaning that possible alternative job-offers for the worker are not increased by 
specific training – once training expenditures have been made, the firm incurs a greater loss if 
the worker quits. As a consequence, there is an incentive for the employer to increase post-
training wages to prevent voluntary quits (see e.g. Parsons, 1986). 
•  In contrast, only the worker will pay for general training – that is training that raises 
productivity at other employers to the same extent as at the employer who provides it – under 
perfect competition in the labour market. This occurs because only the worker can reap the 
benefits from this type of training, since any alternative wage offer rises proportionately with 
his/her productivity. However, imperfections in other markets (e.g. the capital market) may 
prevent workers from choosing the optimal amount of human capital investment (Becker, 
1975). 
15.  Chart 3 shows that most CVT courses are entirely paid by employers. With the exception of three 
countries (Ireland, Italy and Switzerland) where about one half of CVT courses are entirely paid by 
employers, firms fully pay for more than 70% of CVT courses.
5 Does this mean that most of the recorded 
training is firm-specific? In fact, empirical evidence suggests that purely firm-specific skills are relatively 
rare (see e.g. Neal, 1995). Stevens (1994, 1999) argues that, in practice, most skills provided through 
training are likely to be neither fully general nor fully firm-specific and uses the term transferable skills for 
skills that are valuable at more than a firm but nonetheless are not valuable at all firms.  
16.  Few national surveys contain explicit information about the generality of skills provided through 
formal training. From those that do, it appears that most of the formal training provided is quite general 
and almost all is transferable
6. Furthermore, it seems that off-site CVT courses (i.e. courses occurring 
                                                      
5.  Even when employers alone are reported to pay for training, they may not bear the full cost because 
workers may indirectly pay for these services through wage adjustments and accepting to be trained outside 
normal working hours. This need not necessarily imply a wage cut since employers can lower or postpone 
wage increases in exchange for training. Similarly, newly-hired workers can be offered a contract with 
lower than usual starting pay combined with the promise of providing training and steeper than usual 
tenure-earnings profile. The empirical literature shows, however, little evidence that workers accept lower 
wages to co-finance training (Barron, Berger and Black, 1999a, Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998, and 
Booth and Bryan, 2002), although there is some evidence that workers bear some of the opportunity cost of 
training by accepting to be trained outside normal working hours, at least under certain circumstances 
(Autor, 2001). 
6.  As regards to the United States, 76% of respondents in the Employer Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP; 
employers) and 73% in the 1993 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY; employees) 
believe that most of the skills acquired through training would be useful at other firms. Fewer than 8% of 
respondents reported that the skills gained through training would not be at all useful at other employers 
(Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999). In the United Kingdom, 85% of training recipients in the 1998-2000 
waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) view their training as general (Booth and Bryan, 
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outside the workplace) impart essentially general skills. By contrast, it is more difficult to establish the 
generality of workplace training (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999). Chart 4 shows that, even considering 
only CVT courses that are entirely employer-paid, on average, CVT occurring at work represent only 35% 
of total CVT in OECD countries. Even in the United Kingdom, the country for which the greatest share of 
workplace training is reported, more than 50% of reported training occurs outside the workplace. In other 
words, most of the employer-paid training reported in available cross-country data seems to be at least 
transferable, whereas, at least in theory, employee financing should take place. 
17.  This inconsistency between theory and evidence suggests that in fact labour markets are not 
perfectly competitive. This would explain why firms have an incentive to pay for a significant share of 
training courses, which are in fact general or transferable. For example, if firms have some degree of 
monopsony power over their trained personnel, employers may be able to recoup training costs by paying a 
trained worker less than his/her post-training marginal product, while still retaining the worker (see 
e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, Stevens, 1999). Stevens (1994, 2001) argues that these conditions are 
particularly likely to prevail for skills that cannot be useful at many other employers. But this also applies 
in the case of fully general training, due to asymmetric information and lack of certification (or lack of 
recognition of qualifications), frictions and search costs, wage-bargaining institutions and outcomes, 
adverse selection affecting quits and lay-offs, or complementarity with specific investments (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1999b). 
18.  Imperfect competition in the labour market, however, is likely to result in under-provision of 
training. Employers’ monopsony power, by compressing the wage distribution, creates the conditions 
under which a significant share of general training costs is borne by the firm – since, under these 
conditions, firms are more able to reap the benefits of training. But under-investment is nevertheless likely 
to occur, because current employers cannot internalise the benefits from training that will accrue to future 
employers.
7  
19.  Labour market imperfections, such as those described above, also reduce workers’ incentives to 
invest in general training, insofar as they decrease workers’ appropriability of its benefits. In particular, if 
pay scales do not reflect marginal productivity, workers cannot fully reap the benefits from general training 
and, therefore, are not able to internalise its lifetime benefits (in contrast with what they could do under 
perfect competition; Becker, 1975). 
20.  Empirical evidence shows that under-provision is likely to occur in all OECD countries. For 
example, Barron, Berger and Black (1999a) estimate that, in the United States, productivity gains after 
training are seven times larger than wage increases, suggesting that firms reap most of the returns from 
training. Furthermore, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998, 1999) find that general training received at 
previous employers, at least if certified, has a greater effect on wages than training provided by the current 
employer, who can exploit its market power to recoup the costs of training – at least partially. Using the 
same dataset but a larger number of waves, Lengermann (1999) finds that the effect of general training 
received at current employers increases over time. Empirical studies for a number of European countries 
have obtained similar results (see e.g. Booth and Bryan, 2002, Ok and Tergeist, 2002, and Fougère, Goux 
and Maurin, 2001). 
21.  Are labour market imperfections, such as employers’ partial monopsony power over their trained 
workforce, the only source of market failure affecting training outcomes? The theoretical literature 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(GSOEP) state that they received a certificate from their training (58%, if only training during work hours 
is considered; see Pischke, 2001). 
7.  This externality is often associated with the phenomenon of “poaching” — that is, a firm can free ride other 









































suggests that other market failures outside the labour markets – due to e.g. imperfections in the training and 
capital markets – may also be important (see Box 1).
8  
Box 1. Non-labour market sources of market failures: theoretical aspects 
There are several sources of non-labour market failures that may affect training outcomes: 
Training market imperfections: First, workers and employers may lack information on teaching quality and be 
unable to distinguish between different providers of educational services. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
training might not be fully contractible: while the amount of training can be written down in a contract, its type and 
quality are less likely to be specified in a manner that is verifiable by third parties such as tribunals (Malcomson, 1997, 
1999, Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). This may induce both the employee and the employer to behave non-co-
operatively and invest in training separately without bargaining. In other words, the employee may refuse to treat the 
employer as a possible (and actually privileged) intermediary or provider of training services and, thus, refuse to share 
the costs of employer-provided training. It can be shown (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a) that, under these conditions, 
if the investments of the employer and the employee are perfect substitutes and returns to training are common 
knowledge, only one party will invest in general training (the one that benefits the most), and the amount of investment 
will depend on the marginal return to that party, being therefore not only sub-optimal but also lower than in the co-
operative case wherein training contracts are enforceable. The non-contractibility of training might also exacerbate 
possible conflicts between employers and employees – the former preferring providing specific training and the latter 
receiving general skills that can be re-sold in the labour market (Stevens, 1994, Barron, Berger and Black, 1999b). 
Capital market imperfections: Unlike physical capital, human capital cannot be used as collateral for borrowing 
(Becker, 1975). Moreover, individual human capital investment is often indivisible so that the risk associated to it 
cannot be diversified. Furthermore this risk can be insured only partially, at best: in practice, private insurance markets 
are unlikely to work in a proper way, due to the unobservability of the trainee’s effort and the size of human capital 
investments (the level of individual liability required to avoid adverse selection would be too high, see e.g. Stevens, 
1999). The employer can partially relax the employee’s credit constraint to the extent that the employee accepts a 
lower wage during the training period. However, there is a limit to the extent to which small firms can borrow to finance 
training expenditures using physical capital as collateral. Furthermore, if workers cannot borrow at a competitive 
interest rate, the demand for training may remain below the social optimum, since in order to smooth consumption over 
time the employee cannot accept large wage cuts (see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a).  
Co-ordination failures: When returns to training and returns to the adoption of new technologies are 
interdependent, both employers and workers may decide not to invest if each side expects low returns. A bad co-
ordination equilibrium may therefore arise, leading to sub-optimal investment in training (Redding, 1996). The same 
argument can be applied to specialisation in high-tech industries. Workers and firms in low-tech industries have little 
incentive to invest in further training since the “upskilled” worker would not in fact perform an “upskilled” activity in the 
same firm and industry, while opportunities for the worker in other (high-tech) industries are small if the share of the 
latter in the national output is small (Crouch et al., 1999). 
22.  In addition, labour market imperfections interact with capital and training market imperfections. 
In fact, if these imperfections are important, it can be shown from a theoretical point of view that the 
greater the wage compression, the greater the total investment in general or transferable training 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). This occurs because, in the presence of firms’ monopsony power, the 
wages of skilled workers may be below their productivity. In such a case, as said above, the employer has a 
greater incentive (and the employee has a lower incentive) to invest in training, the greater the difference 
between the productivity of trained workers and their wages. When workers are credit constrained, wage 
                                                      
8.  The list of market failures in Box 1 is not exhaustive and is limited to those that are more frequently 
considered in the literature on general training. See e.g. Temple (2001) and Malcomson (1997) for 
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compression increases the amount invested by the employer without significantly reducing that made by 
the employee, which is already low. A similar argument can be made if training is not contractible.
9 
23.  Brunello (2003) finds evidence of such a negative relationship between training and wage 
dispersion in EU countries, which also appears to be stronger in the case of low educated workers.
10 That 
analysis is extended here to examine differences in the effect of wage dispersion between gender and age 
classes as well as workers with different educational attainment.
11 First, simple probit models are 
considered where the probability of participating in total CVT (including non-sponsored training) is 
estimated as a function of standard individual and firm characteristics as well as wage dispersion. Total 
training participation is estimated to decrease significantly with wage dispersion only in the case of 
employees with less than upper secondary education (Table 3). For instance, Column 4 shows that a 10% 
decrease in the wage dispersion is estimated to increase the probability of being trained for male 
individuals with low educational attainment by approximately 2.5%. By contrast, the effect is less 
significant for workers with upper secondary education and above. Differences between gender and age 
appear to be limited. 
24.  Following Brunello (2002, 2003) a trinomial logit model is also estimated to study whether the 
association between wage dispersion and CVT participation differs between off-site and workplace 
training (Table 4).
12 Both off-site (general) and workplace (perhaps more specific) training are found to be 
negatively associated with wage dispersion in the case of low educated men (including older workers), 
although the relationship is less significant in the case of women. Conversely, no significant relationship is 
estimated for workers with upper secondary education and above.  
25.  The negative relationship between training and wage dispersion might be interpreted as indirect 
evidence that one of the following holds true: i) credit constraints (and wealth/income constraints) are 
greater for low-educated (low-income/low-wealth) workers; and/or ii) these workers find it more difficult 
to negotiate with their employers about the content and quality of training programmes. In such a situation, 
co-financing policies that increase incentives for firms to invest in training (such as corporate tax 
deductions) are likely to have a positive impact also on the amount of training received by low-educated 
workers. This is not the case, however, for women. A possible explanation for estimated gender differences 
is that women and men, with equal levels of qualification and experience, compete for the same 
opportunities within the firm. To the extent that employers do not wish to train and promote all interested 
workers, male employees might be disproportionately selected, due to pure or statistical discrimination 
                                                      
9.  However, if the imperfections in the other markets are not too severe, the negative effect of labour market 
imperfections on workers’ willingness to invest will dominate, resulting in aggregate under-investment, 
since workers can better internalise lifetime benefits from training than their employers (Stevens, 2001). 
10.  Brunello (2002, 2003) suggests to partition employees into clusters of relatively homogenous workers and 
compare training participation rates with wage distributions computed for each of these clusters. An 
alternative route consists in estimating the impact of minimum wage on training. Indeed, statutory or 
contractual minimum wages twist the lower tail of the wage distribution without necessarily affecting 
individual productivity. Recent empirical studies, which use direct information on training, has yielded 
contradictory findings about the impact of the minimum wage on CVT (see Grossberg and Sicilian, 1999, 
Neumark and Wascher, 2001, Acemoglu and Pischke, 2003, for the United States, and Arulampalam, 
Booth and Bryan, 2002, for the United Kingdom). 
11.  Wage dispersion is defined here as the logarithmic difference between the 90th and the 10th percentile of 
gross hourly wages of male wage and salary employees. To minimise endogeneity problems, wage 
dispersions are computed two years before and excluding workers who are still in training or education. 
Clusters with less than 30 observations are excluded from the analysis. 









































and/or to the fact that men are less time-constrained by family responsibilities (see OECD, 2002a and 
Section 2.C). 
B.  Disentangling employers’ supply from employees’ demand 
26.  The findings of Section 2.A suggest that market failures have an important impact on the level of 
training, with both employers’ and employees’ investment decisions being affected by institutional factors 
such as the degree of firms’ monopsony power or the transferable nature of training. That analysis also 
suggests that these institutional factors affect training inequalities. From the point of view of policy making 
it is however essential to understand whether the source of under-investment is mainly affecting 
employers’ or employees’ behaviour. Furthermore, the inequality patterns discussed in Section 1 can be 
ascribed to market failures only partially and depend also on the variation of social returns to training 
across different worker groups. For instance, even in the absence of market failures certain workers may 
have a weak demand for training – due to low expected rates of returns, or weak motivation. Policy 
implications will depend on whether bottlenecks are on the supply or the demand side. 
27.  The market for CVT can be broken into two sub-markets: an upstream market, in which 
employers buy training services from a training provider; and a downstream market, in which employers 
re-sell these training services to their employees, with the price for training hidden in wages (the price of 
the latter transaction might be even zero when the employer bears all the cost). In the downstream training 
market, one can in principle distinguish between supply (by the employer) and demand (by the 
employee).
13 Training outcomes can be analysed as the resulting equilibrium from the inter-reaction of 
supply and demand. 
28.  Most of the available datasets, however, lack sufficient information to identify training supply 
and demand. Consistently, analyses using these data are limited to the resulting equilibrium outcome. 
However the IALS allows the supply and demand factors underlying equilibrium outcomes to be identified 
(see Annex 1). This survey contains information on CVT courses that workers would have liked to have 
taken but could not, because they could not afford (or did not want) to pay for the implicit or explicit price 
required. Workers that responded positively to this question are called “constrained workers”, as in 
Oosterbeek (1998) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999), and can be assumed to have a positive training 
demand at least at zero cost borne by them.
14 26% of employed workers of OECD countries covered in the 
sample are “constrained” (Table 5). In all countries except Finland, workers who already receive some 
training are more frequently “constrained” than non-participants (31.5% versus 23%). Amongst training 
participants, workers who do not receive support from their employer report a particularly high incidence 
of constraints: on average, almost 40% of these workers would have liked to receive more training.
15  
                                                      
13.  In the upstream market, training supplier and demander might be the same institution in the case of internal 
CVT; in such a case the price of the upstream transaction is not observable and potentially ill-defined. 
14.  The phrasing of the question is as follows: “Since August (Year) was there any training or education that 
you wanted to take for career or job-related reasons but did not?”. In fact, this formulation is somewhat 
ambiguous, and it can expected that workers declaring themselves constrained are those who expect 
positive returns from training even taking part of the (direct or opportunity) cost of training into account 
(e.g. part of the foregone income and leisure time, alternative investment opportunities, displeasure they 
associate with formal learning, due to bad pedagogical experiences, etc.). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
workers not being at least indifferent, with respect to being trained, in the absence of any implicit or 
explicit cost for them. Anyway, it can be shown that the identification strategy is still valid (see Annex 1). 
15.  The fact that people that received employer-sponsored training also tend to have a higher demand for 
additional training might reflect a number of economic factors (such as the interplay between credit or time 
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29.  In the remainder of this section, relative patterns of demand (by employees) and supply (by 
employers) are analysed through the estimation of bivariate probit models of demand and equilibrium 
outcomes.
16 These models are estimated subject to the assumption that, by threatening lay-offs and/or 
offering monetary compensation, an employer can always convince a worker to be trained (see Annex 1 for 
a detailed description of the identification issues involved).
17 Although employers’ supply cannot be 
directly estimated, information on it can be derived by comparing demand and equilibrium estimates (see 
Annex 1). For example, if training demand for, say, women is estimated to be significantly greater than 
training demand by men, but no significant difference is estimated for equilibrium outcomes, this can be 
interpreted as evidence that, for any given price of training, employers’ supply is greater for men than for 
women. 
30.  Table 6 presents maximum likelihood estimation results for a pooled sample of 15 countries.
18 In 
comparison to their male peers, women suffer from less satisfied training demands (demand is greater, and 
supply smaller, for women than for men).
19 The same occurs for immigrants with respect to their native 
peers. These results possibly reflect lower expected returns by their employer (statistical discrimination), 
because of lower expected benefits (in the case of women, due to career breaks, maternity leave, etc.) or 
higher expected costs (in the case of immigrants, due to language reasons). 
31.  Training supply for very young workers (aged 16 to 25 years) appears to be smaller than that of 
prime-age employees, while the opposite occurs for older workers.
20 Age might in part capture the effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
economic reasons may also be important for explaining why certain groups of individuals have higher or 
lower demand for training. OECD (2003a) identifies a number of non-economic factors affecting adults’ 
demands for training such as access to information, motivational aspects, and lack of appropriate 
pedagogy.  
16.  Initially estimations are made for a limited number of individual characteristics (including, gender, age, 
education, country of birth, and occupation) and firm characteristics (firm size, sector), in order to 
maximise country coverage. Subsequently, over a limited country sample, the analysis is expanded to 
encompass the effects of literacy and parental background in order to provide a fuller analysis of the role of 
education as a source of inequality of access to training. Finally, type of contract and work status is also 
considered. The analysis will be limited to workers aged 16 to 65 years with at least some education who 
are employed by non-agricultural firms with more than 20 employees. The reference individual is a native 
male employee aged 36 to 45 years, with upper secondary education, who has changed job in the last 12 
months and is working full-time as a clerk in a firm with 100 to 199 employees, located in an urban area 
and whose main business is in the mining, manufacturing or energy industry. 
17.  Another scenario, which assumes that employers cannot force their employees to be trained against their 
will (even at zero cost for the employees; see Annex 1), is also considered, but no significant difference in 
the estimates – reported in Annex 2 – appears between the two scenarios. 
18.  These countries are Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
19.  Estimation results presented here are robust to the simultaneous exclusion of transition economies and of 
those countries with a small number of observations (Belgium and Ireland, which have less than 800 
observations each). Furthermore, if the remaining sample of 10 countries is split into two groups 
(continental European and English-speaking economies), the results are qualitatively the same and 
invariant across groups. 
20.  Both the probability of receiving training in equilibrium and of demanding training at zero cost are lower 
for older workers than for prime-age men. Nevertheless, the shift of the equilibrium outcome is much 
smaller than that of demand, leading to the conclusion that supply is greater for employees in this age class 









































tenure, for which there are insufficient controls in the equation due to data limitations.
21 Conversely, the 
result for older workers might reflect possible differences in pay-back periods between employers and 
employees.
 22 In equilibrium, pay-back periods for general training are likely to be longer for the employee 
than for the employer.
23 As a consequence, the age above which it is no longer profitable to pay for 
training (because the pay-back period is longer than the remaining number of years before retirement) is 
likely to be lower for the employee than for his/her employer. 
32.  The estimates also indicate that demand for training is relatively flat with respect to the type of 
occupation, while supply is estimated to increase with the degree of skill-intensity. By contrast, demand for 
training is estimated to be greater the higher the level of educational attainment, but this is not the case for 
supply.
24 These results might arise because of training market imperfections – e.g. as a result of imperfect 
information or contractibility – credit constraints and employers’ monopsony power, that appear to be 
greater, the lower the level of educational attainment (see Section 2.A). 
33.  Finally, training supply is estimated to be increasing with firm size while training demand is not. 
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that larger internal labour markets present greater 
opportunities to reap the benefits from training through internal promotion or re-assignment of trained 
workers.
25 Furthermore, in industries where product market competition is strong and the number of 
competitors large (such as construction, wholesale and retail trade, and community, social and personal 
services), employers’ market power over their skilled employees is likely to be relatively small. This may 
explain why, ceteris paribus, supply is estimated to be smaller (and demand greater) in these industries 
than in the other industries.
26 
34.  Demand and supply of training are likely to be influenced by individual histories preceding 
current job experience and entry in the labour market. These histories are not fully captured by educational 
attainment. For instance, literacy scores of those participating in employer-sponsored training are greater 
                                                      
21.  This result might also reflect the fact that temporary jobs are not controlled for in these specifications, due 
to data limitations. However, on a smaller sample with only 8 countries, this result is robust to the inclusion 
of a dummy for temporary contracts (see Annex 2). 
22.  The pay-back period is defined as the number of years an investment needs to yield the expected revenue 
in order to be profitable. 
23.  The length of the pay-back period for human capital investments for both employers and employees is 
likely to depend mainly on individual characteristics that affects the cost of (and total potential benefits 
from) training. By contrast, the difference between employers’ and employees’ pay-back periods is likely 
to depend also on the wage structure and educational attainment, insofar as they affect the sharing of the 
benefits from training, but plausibly does not depend on age. In equilibrium — that is, given a certain 
division of costs and benefits from training — it is plausible that rate of returns from training are 
approximately equal for the employee and for the employer. As a consequence, pay-back periods for 
general training are likely to be longer for the employee than for the employer because the former retains 
his/her share of benefits upon quitting, while the latter does not. If this were not the case, workers 
(particularly when young) would find it profitable to increase the investment in training beyond the 
equilibrium amount. 
24.  The only statement that can be made about supply is that it does not increase with educational attainment, 
but it cannot be established whether it decreases or remains approximately constant. This is due to the fact 
that the estimated probabilities of demanding training at zero cost and of receiving training in equilibrium 
increase by approximately the same amount (see Annex 1). 
25.  Furthermore, small firms may invest less in training due to the fixed costs involved and the difficulty to 
replace a worker who temporarily leaves for training. 
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than that of non-participants at any level of education (Chart 5). The average literacy score
27 of participants 
is 4% greater for workers with a tertiary qualification and 9% greater in the case of those with less than 
upper secondary education. Although the direction of causality is not clear-cut, there is some evidence that 
most literacy skills are developed by individuals at relatively young ages, typically before joining the 
labour market,
28 and that subsequent CVT spells do not modify the level of literacy in a significant way. 
Thus, Chart 5 suggests a causal relationship between literacy and training participation. 
35.  Instrumental variable (IV) techniques have to be used to confirm this statement.
29 The IV 
estimates of the impact of literacy and related variables on training supply and demand are shown in 
Table  7. The table shows that training demand is not significantly affected by literacy, while the 
equilibrium outcome is greater, the higher the literacy score. In other words, training supply is increasing 
with the level of literacy, suggesting that employers believe that learning ability increases (and therefore 
training costs decrease) with basic general skills, including literacy. 
36.  There is some evidence in the literature that in many OECD countries the incidence of employer-
sponsored training is increasing with job-complexity (Barron, Berger, and Black, 1999a,b), and is lower 
for part-time (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 1999) and temporary workers (OECD 2002a). Table  8 shows 
estimation results for augmented versions of the specification reported in Table 6, which has been extended 
to include dummies for different types of contract (voluntary and involuntary part-time, temporary contract 
and supervisory role).
30  
37.  With respect to full-time employees, there is a strong evidence of much lower training supply for 
involuntary part-time workers, while demand is not significantly lower. The same applies to workers with 
temporary contracts compared with those with permanent contracts. Statistical discrimination, tenure 
effects and higher probability of quitting (voluntarily) can plausibly explain these findings.
31 Similarly, 
employees working part-time for family or health reasons tend to be confronted with lower supply than 
full-time workers,
32 although estimates are not always significant.
33 
                                                      
27.  Simple average of the three literacy scores reported in the IALS that measure proficiency in prose, reading 
and quantitative skills on a 0-500 quantitative scale (see OECD and Statistics Canada, 2000). 
28.  In most countries, the mean performance of PISA students (at age 15) on the IALS literacy scale is greater 
than the mean performance of IALS individuals both in the whole sample and restricting the comparison to 
IALS individuals aged 26 to 35 years who completed secondary education (see OECD and Statistics 
Canada, 2000, and OECD, 2003b). 
29.  For five countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy and the United States), the IALS contains a large set of 
information on parental background — namely, educational attainment of parents, father’s occupation and 
a dummy for whether the mother has worked. The effect of parental background on training demand and 
supply is likely to occur essentially through literacy and education. Accordingly, these background 
variables can be used as instruments for literacy in a training regression. 
30.  These equations are estimated for varying country samples, depending on data availability. 
31.  The situation is very different for individuals working part-time voluntarily for reasons other than family or 
health problems or part-time education (demand at zero cost is particularly low for these workers while no 
clear statement on supply can be made). 
32.  In this case a different explanation of this result is more likely to be true. Family responsibilities is one of 
the main reasons for being “constrained” (see Section 2.C). Demand is identified at zero implicit or explicit 
costs for the worker, including day care for children and relatives. Part-time workers for family reasons are 
therefore likely to find certain types of training too expensive in terms of their associated day care costs. 
33.  Supply is also unambiguously greater for individuals with a great supervisory role compared with 









































C. Constrained  workers 
38.  There are several reasons why workers’ demand (at zero cost) may not be satisfied. The 
incidence of different constraints affecting demand might affect the effectiveness of possible policy 
measures. For example, policy schemes allowing only relaxation of financial constraints (such as loan 
schemes or individual subsidies) will not help much when lack of time is the main constraint. In the latter 
case, more effective policy instruments might be provisions for training leaves and/or time accounts. The 
IALS provides some information on the reasons why workers are constrained.
34  
39.  Chart 6 shows the incidence of constrained workers by detailed reasons for both participants and 
non-participants in CVT. The most important constraint seems to be associated with the employee’s 
shortage of available time for training. Around 15% of trained workers and 10% of non-trained workers 
claim that they could not take the desired training courses due to lack of time. Furthermore, a significant 
number of constrained workers declare that they could not take all the training they wanted either because 
they were too busy at work or because the time schedule was inappropriate or because of family 
responsibilities. Since multiple answers are allowed in the survey, these figures are not additive. 
Nevertheless, taking multiple answers into account, time is an issue for more than 60% of the workers who 
could not take the training they wanted. Though less important than time-related constraints, many 
employees report that they could not afford to pay for the cost of the training courses they wanted to take 
(about 7% of trained workers and 5% of non-trained workers).
35  
40.  Although time-related constraints emerge as the most important factor, its incidence varies across 
groups. Particularly, among “constrained” workers, the probability of being time-constrained is estimated 
to be 9 percentage points greater for managers and 10 percentage points lower for workers in elementary 
occupations than for clerks (Chart 7).
36 On the other hand, the probability of being constrained by financial 
reasons for managers is 4 percentage points lower than for clerical workers, while it is 7 percentage points 
higher for workers in elementary occupations. In other words, policy measures affecting costs 
(e.g. individual subsidies) may increase training participation of workers in low-skilled occupations even 
when they do not increase workers’ time availability (i.e. even in the absence of time accounts or training 
leave schemes).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
findings suggest that employers tend to sort more able employees into better career and training 
opportunities simultaneously. Conversely, workers with no supervisory role seem to have lower demand 
than individuals with more supervisory responsibility. 
34.  It must be noted at the outset, however, that this piece of information concerns only individuals with 
positive demand who, while not receiving enough employer-sponsored training, do not end up paying for 
the additional training they require themselves. Conversely, it cannot shed further light on the reasons why 
certain individuals demand little training (for example because of low returns due to low productivity, 
training market imperfections, interactions between age and pay-back periods, and to some extent credit 
market imperfections). 
35.  Given the ambiguity of the question on desired further training (see footnote 14) as well as of the definition 
of this constraint in the questionnaire (“too expensive/lack of money”), it is unlikely that all individuals 
that are credit-constrained reported that they suffer from this constraint. Plausibly, this constraint is likely 
to capture unaffordable course fees but not issues related to foregone income. 
36.  These figures refer to the estimated probability that a specific constraint binds conditional to the fact that 
there is at least one constraint that is binding, after controlling for all other characteristics. Probit estimates 
of the probability of reporting each constraint as a function of personal and job characteristics are reported 
in the Annex 2. However, the sample size is relatively small when the analysis is limited to constrained 
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41.  Amongst “constrained” women working full-time, the estimated probability of being constrained 
because of either training cost or family responsibilities is 7 and 8 percentage points higher, respectively, 
than for men. This might be explained by two factors. On the one hand, women are more likely to be 
excluded by employer-sponsored training (see Sections 2.A and 2.B) and earn on average less than men — 
so that they might find training courses less affordable. On the other hand, women are less likely to exploit 
training opportunities available outside normal working hours, since these would make them stay away 
from home for even longer hours. The same argument applies to individuals working part-time because of 
health or family reasons. In particular, amongst “constrained” women working part-time, the estimated 
probabilities of the cost and family constraints are 13 and 31 percentage points higher, respectively, than in 
the case of men working full-time.  
3. Conclusions 
42.  The preceding sections suggest that training opportunities are unevenly distributed across 
workers, and that training incidence falls short of socially desirable levels. Factors that affect the cost and 
benefits of CVT appear to contribute to both uneven distribution and under-provision of training. More 
precisely, Section 1 has shown that certain groups of individuals receive more employer-sponsored training 
than others. Section  2 has identified several sources of market failures (including labour, capital and 
training market imperfections) leading to under-provision of training, and shown that some of the 
inequalities in training access can be ascribed to these failures. Furthermore, Section 2 has decomposed the 
downstream training market
37 in order to trace the extent to which differences in the provision of 
employer-sponsored training across groups of workers are due to demand (by employees) or supply (by 
employers). The empirical results suggest that employers tend to exclude women, immigrants, young 
employees, involuntary part-time and temporary workers, workers in low-skilled occupations and workers 
with low literacy, when selecting which employees to train (Table 10). By contrast, lower demand appears 
to account for lower training participation of older and less educated workers. In the case of older workers, 
labour market imperfections affecting the distribution of training benefits and the length of employers’ and 
employees’ pay-back periods are likely to be behind this pattern. In the case of less educated workers, 
credit constraints and/or training market imperfections – due to lack of training information and 
contractibility between employers and employees – may partially explain this finding. However, non-
economic factors, such as lesser motivation or bad pedagogical experiences, must also be taken into 
account. Finally, demand does not appear to vary with firm size or sector. However, supply rises with firm 
size, perhaps due to lower unit costs of training, larger benefits, and greater access to credit and 
information for large firms. 
43.  The first-best approach to overcoming market failures would be to eliminate market 
imperfections through structural reforms. However, some of these imperfections are “natural” 
characteristics of certain markets (e.g. the lower level of competition in the market for workers who have 
acquired transferable skills, which are not valuable at every firm) and effective reforms to overcome them 
have not been proposed yet. Furthermore, other imperfections are induced by institutions and policies that 
do not concern primarily training outcomes (e.g. those affecting the distribution of earnings such as 
minimum wages), whose reform cannot be undertaken without a careful evaluation of all other relevant 
trade-offs. A second-best approach to improving training outcomes is to increase the economic incentives 
to demand and supply training through fiscal policy and institutional arrangements favouring cost-sharing 
among private parties. This second-best approach can also target disadvantaged groups more easily, given 
                                                      
37.  It has been noticed in Section 2 that the market for CVT is particularly complex when training within the 
firm is considered. In that case, it can be disaggregated into two sub-markets: upstream, employers buy 
training services from a training provider; downstream employers re-sell these training services to their 









































that not all the training gaps are due to market failures (as discussed in Section 2.B). However, policy 
design is crucial, since some of the identified sources of market failure (e.g. lack of contractibility of 
training quality) can equally lead to policy failures, with the risk of large deadweight losses and heavy 
burdens for the public budget. For the same reason, a comprehensive policy strategy is more likely to be 
effective in reducing both under-provision and inequalities. 
44.  This section reviews the experience of OECD member countries with various second-best 
approaches to surmount financial and economic barriers to the provision of and participation in CVT. It 
must be stressed at the outset that the analysis is essentially based on deductive arguments derived from the 
empirical results of the previous sections. In fact, there are only few empirical evaluations of existing 
schemes, in part due to the novelty of most of them. Furthermore, with few exceptions, available 
evaluations are limited to descriptive statistics and do not build up counterfactuals, against which a 
rigorous assessment could be made. For these reasons, for each specific policy, it is only possible to 
identify the problem it can address and whether it has been implemented in a consistent way but not 
whether each intervention has been excessive, insufficient or just right to attain its target.
38 
45.  Since the 1960s, policies in this area were formulated to address, first and foremost, perceived 
rigidities on the supply side that interfered with adult education and training. The underlying assumption 
was one of substantial economic and social demand for adults to return to formal education. Thus, the 
objective of recurrent education was to improve learning opportunities for individuals by enhancing the 
capacity of the formal education sector to accommodate those wishing to return to education, whether to 
overcome deficiencies due to early school leaving, or to update and further upgrade qualifications. 
However, recurrent education never emerged as an enduring widespread practice, in part because its 
associated costs were never adequately funded.  
46.  More recently, improving CVT has emerged as a distinct policy issue from facilitating adult 
participation in recurrent education and active labour market policy (in which those at risk in the labour 
market engage in short-term training to compensate for skill deficiencies). This distinction has brought 
about a shift in the target of public policy from providers and systems geared to provision of education and 
training with relatively homogeneous content to the demand of individuals and employers for more 
heterogeneous learning outcomes. In other words, in contrast to children in initial education, learning 
objectives of individual adults are ever changing and highly heterogeneous so that such needs could be met 
only through a more differentiated arrangement of providers and courses than the delivery mode 
characterising initial education. As a consequence, policy strategies to improve training outcomes have 
shifted from direct subsidisation of external (public or private) providers of training services to co-
financing schemes intended to increase incentives for employers and/or individuals to invest in training. 
The shift towards this policy approach is based on three general principles:  
•  in most societies, because of the budget constraint, public authorities alone cannot provide 
the necessary financial resources for lifelong learning; 
•  as lifelong learning generates considerable private returns, employers and employees should 
finance most of its costs; and  
                                                      
38.  Due to the methodological complexity of ex-post assessment, evaluation mechanisms should be included 
into policy design to ensure timely corrections of policy mistakes. It is true that most policy innovation are 
usually tried and evaluated as pilot programs first. However, certain experiences (such as with the British 
individual learning accounts) show that not all the possible implementation problems of mass-scale 
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•  greater reliance on market forces could strengthen the incentives both for learners to seek 
more efficient learning options and for providers to achieve higher levels of efficiency.  
47.  Co-financing mechanisms – i.e. schemes that channel resources from at least two parties among 
employers, employees and governments – can be designed to increase training incentives for employers, 
for individuals or for both. Since the primary reason for which employers may invest in training less than 
the socially optimal amount is that current employers cannot internalise benefits from training that will 
accrue to future employers (as discussed in Section  2.A), tax arrangements or grant schemes for 
enterprises can be used to tackle aggregate under-investment. By modifying the marginal cost of training 
these schemes may raise employers’ supply towards the socially optimal level. Also, these schemes can be 
complemented by policies favouring cost-sharing between employers and employees, such as regulatory 
provisions for pay-back clauses and time accounts, to the extent that training market imperfections are not 
too strong. In fact, as discussed in Section 2.A, cost-sharing is unlikely to occur if the content and quality 
of training are not contractible. Moreover, transparent accounting and disclosure practices can have an 
important role in channelling resources from the stock market towards training firms, thereby increasing 
their incentives to train (OECD and Ernst & Young, 1997). 
48.  It can be inferred from the analysis of Section  2 that co-financing incentives directed to 
employers (such as tax arrangements and grant schemes) might help to foster training participation of 
prime-age skilled men and of those with little demand, whose training is nonetheless profitable for firms, 
such as older workers and the low educated (see Table 10). For the same reason, policies of this kind are 
also likely to benefit workers in large firms, high-tech industries and industries wherein the number of 
competitors is relatively small. If targeted, these policies might improve the position also of other groups, 
particularly workers in small firms, but there is only limited evidence of success stories of this kind.
39 
49.  For workers who have less frequent opportunities to receive employer-sponsored training – 
namely women, immigrants, involuntary part-time and temporary workers, workers in small firms, in low-
skilled occupations, in low-tech industries and/or workers with low literacy within each educational 
attainment class –, it is likely to be difficult to target policies focussing on employers’ incentives in an 
efficient way (Table 10). Individual-based demand-side policies (such as loan and subsidy schemes), by 
relaxing individual borrowing constraints and increasing expected rates of return, can thus play a 
complementary role. Furthermore, some of these policies (e.g. certain subsidy schemes such as individual 
learning accounts) address both economic and non-economic barriers to training. However, they require 
the diffusion of information that workers often do not have. In addition, portability and certification of 
skills must be assured. As a consequence, financial incentives must be accompanied by adequate 
framework conditions. Even in this case it might be difficult to target with precision certain workers (such 
as the under-literate workers within the low-educated). Strengthening delivery of formal education emerges 
therefore as a complementary policy instrument (see OECD, 2002b). 
                                                      
39.  A special case can be made for young workers. Certain schemes, although untargeted in principle, may be 
designed in such a way that they make training newly hired young workers comparatively less costly than 
training more mature and experienced workers. This is the case, for instance, of tax arrangements that do 
not allow deduction of employers’ opportunity costs such as foregone productivity which can be expected 











































IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF TRAINING DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
50.  Information on constrained workers can be used to identify the demand for training of employed 
persons. Workers declaring that they are “constrained” clearly believe that their return from training is 
non-negative, at least if they do not have to pay for it. It can be said that an individual has a positive 
demand (at zero cost for the individual) if he/she declares to have taken non-sponsored training courses 
and/or to desire further training.
40 
 From this information the probability of demanding training can be 
estimated as a function of personal and job characteristics. Taking two different groups of individuals and 
assuming that demand curves are downward sloped (with respect to the implicit or explicit price of 
training) and do not cross each other, it is therefore possible to estimate whether one group has greater 
demand than another by estimating their respective probabilities of desiring further training at zero cost 
(points A and A’ in Chart A1.1). 
51.  Rigorously speaking, without additional assumptions on employers’ behaviour, the demand-
identification strategy described above is valid only for employees not receiving employer-sponsored 
training. Indeed, workers who receive employer-sponsored training may or may not have a positive 
demand for training, depending on employers’ behaviour and training bargaining outcomes. Two extreme 
alternative assumptions can be selected: 
•  Hypothesis A: as assumed by Oosterbeek (1998) in a similar analysis for the Netherlands, 
employers cannot force their employees to be trained against their will (even at zero cost for 
the employees), therefore training takes place only if the worker’s demand is non-negative; or 
•  Hypothesis B: by threatening lay-offs and/or offering monetary compensation, an employer 
can always force a worker to be trained, therefore demand at zero cost for workers receiving 
employer-sponsored CVT might not be positive and its sign is unobservable. 
52.  Hypothesis A allows the identification of demand on the whole sample while, under Hypothesis 
B, demand can be consistently estimated only on the subsample of those non-receiving employer-
sponsored training (see Table A1.1). Furthermore, these additional assumptions on employers’ behaviour 
                                                      
40.  The exact phrasing of the question is as follows: “Since August (Year) was there any training or education 
that you wanted to take for career or job-related reasons but did not?”. As already noted, the phrasing of the 
question is somewhat ambiguous, and it can expected that workers declaring themselves constrained are 
those who expect positive returns from training even taking part of the cost of training into account. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine workers not being at least indifferent, with respect to being trained, in the 
absence of any implicit or explicit cost for them. Anyway, except when otherwise mentioned, the 
identification strategy is still valid if additional hypotheses are made to take into account this issue — 
namely that i) individuals interpret this question as asking whether they would like to receive further 
training for a fixed implicit or explicit cost supported by them; and ii) that this perceived cost (or price) 
threshold does not depend on observable individual characteristics and can be modelled as a constant plus a 
standard error term. Simply, demand will be identified at this price threshold — that is perceived as 
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and bargaining outcomes allow deriving the relative positions of supply schedules from the simultaneous 
estimation of demand and equilibrium outcomes (the point of intersection between supply and demand, B 
and B’ in Chart A1.1). 
53.  In practice, under both hypotheses, the final econometric model jointly estimates the probability 
of receiving employer-sponsored training in equilibrium and the probability of demanding training at zero 
cost as a function of personal and firm characteristics (in a bivariate probit framework).
41 To do so, for the 
equilibrium outcome, the dependent variable takes value one if the worker has received employer-
sponsored training and zero otherwise while, for demand, it takes value one if the worker has received 
training or is “constrained” and zero otherwise. Under Hypothesis  B, the latter is estimated only 
conditional on the fact that the worker has not received any employer-sponsored training, which, under this 
hypothesis, when it has taken place, prevents the observation of demand. By contrast the equilibrium 
outcome is estimated on the whole sample. Symmetrically, under Hypothesis A, the equilibrium outcome 
is estimated only conditional on the worker having received training or being willing to be trained at zero 
individual cost, while demand is estimated on the whole sample. Under this hypothesis demand can be 
identified on the whole sample. Hence, not using the information concerning recipients of employer-
sponsored training would be inefficient. In principle, the correlation between the error terms of the demand 
and equilibrium outcome equations must be taken into account (to avoid selection bias). However, since 
Oosterbeek (1998), in a similar analysis for the Netherlands, does not find this correlation to be significant, 
for computational reasons the equations are estimated as if the residuals were incorrelated. 
54.  Under both hypotheses, information on the relative position of employers’ supply for different 
groups can then be derived by comparing demand and equilibrium outcomes, on the basis of the 
assumption that supply curves are upward sloped and do not cross each other. Only the relative positions of 
supply and demand for different groups of workers can be identified. In other words it is possible to 
estimate whether employers’ supply for one group is greater than that for another group, but not the whole 
supply schedules. The same limitation holds as regards to the demand schedules. Table A1.2 summarises 
all possible combinations of demand and equilibrium estimates and their implications for employers’ 
supply. For example, if training demand for, say, women is estimated to be significantly greater than 
training demand by men, but no significant difference is estimated for equilibrium outcomes (first row in 
the table), this can be interpreted as evidence that for any given price of training, employers’ supply is 
greater for men than for women. Equivalently, the supply curve for women is above that for men (compare 
S and S’ with D and D’ in the Chart A1.1). To the extent that results are consistent under both hypotheses 
A and B, some statements on supply and demand can be derived with some confidence. Tables 7 to 9 are 
based only on estimates under Hypothesis B. However, results, reported in details in Annex 2, are similar 
when estimations are carried over under Hypothesis A. 
                                                      
41.  Under Hypothesis B, demand and equilibrium outcome can be consistently estimated using also the 
additional hypotheses discussed in the previous footnote that allow for a more plausible interpretation of 
respondents’ reaction to the question on further training. Simply, the probability of demanding training is 
estimated at the price threshold that is perceived to be implicit in the question on further training, rather 
than being identified at zero cost supported by the respondent. By contrast, subject to Hypothesis A, in 
order for the estimation procedure to be consistent with the hypotheses of the previous footnote, training 
must take place only if workers’ demand is non-negative at the perceived price threshold. This would 
imply that training occurs only if employees would have responded “yes” to the question on desired further 
training if they had not received any training. In other words, it would imply assuming under Hypothesis A 
that there are always some implicit training cost for the employee (such as displeasure from learning, 












































DATA DEFINITIONS AND DETAILED ESTIMATION RESULTS 
A.  Data sources and definitions 
Data sources 
55.  The quantitative analysis contained in this paper is based on data from the following three 
sources: 
a)  International Adult Literacy Survey (OECD and Statistics Canada) 
 The  International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) is an individual survey using a common 
questionnaire. The survey asks whether the workers have received any training or education during the 
12 months prior to the survey, but it includes details only about the three most recent courses (purpose, 
financing, training institution, duration etc.). For this reason the number of hours of training is 
underestimated in the case of workers having taken more than three courses. Data refer to 1994 for Canada, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and the United 
States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom and to 1998 
for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of 
Switzerland. See Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999) and OECD and Statistics Canada (2000) for evaluations 
of the data quality of this survey. 
b)  European Community Household Survey (EUROSTAT) 
 The  European Community Household Survey (ECHP) is designed for longitudinal analysis of the 
economic and social position of individuals in the European Union countries. This survey provides rich 
information regarding work status, income, education etc. Since the statistical work on these data was 
carried over before the December 2002 release, estimates presented in this paper are based on data released 
in December 2001, which contain 5 waves from 1994 to 1998. The survey includes the 15 European Union 
member countries. The data used in this paper refer to 1996 (wave 3) for Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, to 1997 (wave 4) for Austria, Greece and Spain and to 
1998 (wave 5) for Portugal. Other EU countries are excluded because of lack of data on training and/or 
sample size. The choice of the wave has been made in such a way to maximise sample size in the 
regression analysis. As regards to CVT, the survey asks whether the worker has participated in any CVT 
during the year prior to the survey. Training participants are asked to report details (location, purpose, 
financing and duration) on only one CVT course. See Peracchi (2002) for an evaluation of the data quality 
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c)  The second Continuing Vocational Training Survey 2 (EUROSTAT) 
 The  second  Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS2) was carried out by EUROSTAT in 
2000 in EU Member states, Norway and 9 EU candidate countries. This is an enterprise survey covering 
establishments with at least 10 employees. It provides information on employer-sponsored training, which 
was taken during the year 1999, for employed persons, excluding apprentices and trainees. The survey 
provides a large set of characteristics for the enterprises, but only gender, training participation and total 
training hours for the employee. No evaluation of data quality is available. For more details on the survey, 
see Eurostat (2000a). 
Data definitions 
56.  CVT may entail the following forms of training (See e.g. Eurostat, 2000a):  
a)  Courses which take place away from the place of work, i.e. in a classroom or training centre, 
at which a group of people receive instruction from teachers/tutors/lecturers for a period of 
time specified in advance by those organising the course.  
b)  Planned periods of training, instruction or practical experience, using the normal tools of 
work, either at the immediate place of work or in the work situation.  
c)  Planned learning through job rotation, exchanges or secondments.  
d)  Attendance at learning/quality circles.  
e)  Self-learning through open and distance learning, (methods used in this type of learning can 
include using video/audio tapes, correspondence courses, computer based methods or the use 
of a Learning Resources Centre).  
f)  Instruction at conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars. 
57.  In practice, the definition of CVT in different surveys varies and thereby the coverage of the 
different forms of training is not the same across surveys. In the CVTS2, the definition of CVT conforms 
strictly with item a above, including post-graduate education but excluding initial training – i.e. training 
received by a person when hired in order to make his/her competencies suited to his/her job assignment. In 
the ECHP, all education and language courses are excluded from the definition of training. Vocational 
training is defined on the basis of country-specific categories used in the Labour Force Survey. A mapping 
of these categories into ECHP variables is provided by Eurostat (2000b). In the IALS, there is a distinction 
between job- or career-related training and training for other purposes. Furthermore, education and training 
courses are divided into seven mutually exclusive categories: i) leading to a university 
degree/diploma/certificate; ii) leading to a college diploma/certificate; iii) leading to a trade-vocational 
diploma/certificate; iv) leading to an apprenticeship certificate; v) leading to an elementary or secondary 
school diploma; vi) leading to professional or career upgrading; and vii) other. For the purpose of this 
paper, only job- or career-related training has been considered in the analysis. Moreover, in order to 
thoroughly exclude formal education courses, only items iv, vi, and vii have been retained in the definition 
of CVT courses, while items i, ii, iii and v are subsumed into the category of other education and training 
(cf. Table 1). According to this definition, Tables A2.1 and A.2 show CVT incidence in each country by 
gender and age and socio-economic characteristics. Charts 1 and 2 in the main text are based on the data 









































58.  The occupation classification used in this paper corresponds approximately to the 1-digit level of 
the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). In Chart 2 and Table A2.2 data have 
been grouped as follows: high-skilled occupations corresponding to managers, professional technicians and 
associate professional (ISCO-88 codes  1 to 3); medium-skilled occupations corresponding to clerks, 
service and sales workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers 
(ISCO-88 codes 4 to 8); and low-skilled occupation corresponding to elementary occupations (ISCO-88 
code 9). 
59.  Hourly earnings used to calculate wage dispersion are computed from gross monthly earnings in 
the main job, by dividing them by 52/12 and by usual weekly hours of work for employees working for at 
least 15 hours a week. Overtime pay and hours are included. Only employees working from 30 to 70 hours 
per week and that are not in education or training are considered. ECHP personal weights have been used 
in the computation of the wage dispersion but not in the regression analysis. 
B.  Detailed estimation results 
Tobit and probit models of the determinants of employer-sponsored training 
60.  Maximum likelihood estimations of a probit model for training participation and a tobit model for 
training hours have been carried over on a pooled sample of fifteen countries to provide further evidence 
on the training gaps discussed in Section 1 on the basis of a bivariate analysis. Estimates based on these 
models are reported in Table  A2.3. Probit regressions are standard when the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable. Conversely, Tobit regressions are standard when the dependent variable is continuous but 
censored. In the probit model, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual participated in at 
least one employer-sponsored CVT course in the twelve months preceding the survey and zero otherwise. 
The table reports in this case the estimated change in the probability of receiving training associated with 
each specific characteristic for an individual otherwise identical to the reference individual. The tobit 
model estimates the association of training hours with the characteristics reported in the table, correcting 
for the sample selection bias due to the fact that individuals with different characteristics have different 
probability of participating in training. The dependent variable in this model is the logarithm of one plus 
training hours received by the individual. This logarithmic form is chosen to eliminate exponential 
heteroskedasticity. The argument of the logarithm is augmented by one because otherwise observations for 
non-participants would be eliminated from the sample. Coefficients can be interpreted as in a standard 
linear regression. 
61.  The reference individual is indicated in the table. Estimations are carried over for a limited 
number of individual characteristics (including, gender, age, education, country of birth, and occupation) 
and firm characteristics (firm size, sector), in order to maximise country coverage. Supervisory role and the 
distinction between self-employed and employees are not taken into account (the inclusion of these 
variables would have limited the analysis to only ten countries). As a consequence, the analysis is also 
restricted to employees of firms with more than twenty employees to eliminate as much as possible self-
employment. Moreover, the sample is limited to employees with at least some education (since those 
without education are rather an exception and are concentrated in few countries) and not working in the 
agricultural sector (because of the special character of the agricultural labour market). As for the analysis 
of Section 2.B the sample include individuals aged 16 to 65 years. This is done for comparison with the 
empirical results that are presented in that section where young individuals are added to preserve a 
sufficiently large sample size. All the results presented in this paper are however robust to the elimination 
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Demand and supply of training 
62.  For five countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy and the United States), the IALS contains a 
large set of information on parental background – namely, educational attainment of parents, father’s 
occupation and a dummy for whether the mother has worked. The effect of parental background on 
training demand and supply is likely to occur essentially through literacy and education. Accordingly, 
these background variables can be used as instruments for literacy in a training regression. To instrument 
literacy, the literacy score is therefore regressed on parental background variables, education and other 
available characteristics (such as gender, age, community size, country of birth, and country dummies) that 
are relatively unlikely to be determined by the level of literacy. To avoid reverse-causality bias, other 
characteristics such as part-time status, industry, occupation, firm size and number of employers are 
excluded from the instrumental regression. Mother’s work status is included separately in the final 
IV regressions estimating the effect of literacy on demand and equilibrium. In fact, mother’s work status 
might be weakly endogenous, to the extent that it affects individual motivation and work attachment, 
particularly of women. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that this is the only parental background 
variable that is found to be significant when included in demand and equilibrium equations (both with and 
without the additional inclusion of literacy). Complete estimation results under both hypotheses A and B 
(see Annex  1) are reported in Table  A2.4, while only the coefficients of literacy estimated under 
hypothesis B are included in Table 7 in the main text. 
63.  Table  A2.5 reports complete estimation results, under both hypotheses, from different 
specifications including type of contract variables (cf. Table 8 in the main text). Three sets of estimates are 
considered. The first specification, which distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary part-time, is 
estimated on the full set of fifteen countries. By contrast, due to data availability, the second and third 
specifications (including also supervisory role and temporary contract, respectively) are estimated on 
smaller sets of countries – including Canada, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, in the case of the second (supervisory role), and 
Canada, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, in the 
case of the third (temporary contract). 
Constrained workers 
64.  Table  A2.6 reports complete results obtained from the estimation of probit models of the 
determinants of each barrier to training reported by constrained workers. Chart 7 in the main text is based 
on these estimates. The dependent variable takes value one if the individual reported a given specific 
constraint and zero if he/she reported to be constrained but did not report that specific constraint. 
Conditional on being constrained, the table reports the estimated change in the probability of being 
constrained by a given specific constraint associated with each characteristic for an individual otherwise 
identical to the reference individual. The equations are estimated only for those countries where sample 
size is greater than 200 observations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, 
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Table 1.   Cross-country variation of training outcomes is large 
CVT 
b courses
Other types of job-




Other types of job-
related education and 
training
Australia 27 24 5 22 15 7
Belgium 
c 13 13 0 10 10 0
Canada 31 28 3 21 17 3
Czech Republic 20 16 5 18 13 5
Denmark 45 45 1 39 36 2
Finland 42 42 1 23 23 1
Hungary 15 14 2 15 13 2
Ireland 12 10 2 14 9 6
Italy 14 14 0 8 8 0
Netherlands 27 24 3 30 21 8
New Zealand 36 34 4 30 23 7
Norway 46 45 1 38 35 3
Poland 12 11 2 10 8 2
Switzerland 15 14 0 9 9 1
United Kingdom 45 44 3 30 22 8
United States 35 33 3 22 18 3







of which: of which:
Participation rate (%)
Employer-sponsored education and training
a
Annual intensity (hours per employee)
 
a)   Data refer to job-related training that employers provided (or partially paid) for employees aged 26 to 65 years 
in 1994 for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and 
the United States, in 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom and in 
1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of 
Switzerland.  
b)   Continuous vocational training.  










































Table 2.   Workers in small firms receive relatively little training  
Number of employees in the firm 10-49 >1000 All
b 10-49 >1000 All
b
A u s t r i a 2 44 33 1 7 1 4 9
Belgium 20 66 41 7 21 13
Czech Republic 24 55 42 6 12 10
D e n m a r k 4 85 65 31 82 42 2
F i n l a n d 3 86 25 01 62 01 8
France 23 62 46 8 25 17
G e r m a n y 2 53 83 2 6 1 0 9
Greece 3 33 15 1 12 6
H u n g a r y 72 6 1 231 05
I r e l a n d 2 85 24 11 31 41 7
I t a l y 1 15 22 6 4 1 6 8
Luxembourg 19 59 36 8 20 14
N e t h e r l a n d s 3 64 24 11 11 91 5
Norway .. .. .. 12 22 16
P o l a n d 84 6 1 631 14
P o r t u g a l 44 3 1 721 47
S p a i n 1 04 62 5 6 1 81 1
Sweden 51 68 61 15 22 18
United Kingdom 35 52 49 12 10 13
Unweighted average 23 50 35 8 17 12
Employer-sponsored CVT by firm size, 1999 
a
Annual intensity (hours per employee) Participation rate (%)
 
a)   Initial vocational training is not included.  For this reason figures for Austria and Germany, where initial training 
plays a major role because of the dual educational system, are not fully comparable with those for the other 
countries. 
b)   All firms with at least 10 employees. 
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Table 3.   Less-educated workers receive more training when wages are 
compressed
Male*D91
b -0.099 -0.092 -0.035 -0.256 * -0.305 * -0.237 *
Older
c*D91
b - - 0.033 - - -0.236 **
Female*D91
b - -0.055 - - -0.201 * -
Age -0.007 * -0.005 * -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.006 *
Job tenure (0 and 1 year) -0.007 0.033 0.008 0.026 0.034 0.064
Job tenure (2 to 5 years) -0.014 -0.020 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 0.030
Job tenure (10 to 14 years) 0.028 0.030 0.060 ** 0.039 0.000 0.043
Job tenure (15 years or more) 0.001 -0.026 0.009 0.025 0.034 0.045
Firm size (more than 500 employees) 0.138 * 0.107 * 0.140 * 0.152 * 0.137 * 0.178 *
Tertiary education 0.065 * 0.066 * 0.044 *** - - -
Prior long term unemployment spell -0.084 * -0.073 * -0.081 ** -0.053 -0.084 * -0.094 *
Female - -0.053 - - -0.108 -
Older workers 
c - - -0.117 - - -0.048
Log Likelihood -3047 -4967 -3128 -898 -1404 -898
Number of observations 6852 10990 7075 4915 7661 5314
Pseudo-R² 0.152 0.138 0.150 0.238 0.219 0.244
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 21 21 21 21 21 2
Men aged 
20-65 years
Employees with less than upper secondary education
Probit-model estimates of the change in training probability associated with each factor
a












*, **, *** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, standard errors adjusted for cluster level 
effects. 
a)  Estimated change in the probability of receiving training with respect to the reference individual.  For continuous 
variables, marginal changes evaluated at the sample mean are reported.  Each equation also includes 8 
occupation dummies, 13 sector dummies and 12 country dummies.  The sample is wage and salary employees 
in the private sector who are no longer in education, and not in the agricultural sector.  The dependent variable 
takes value 1 for workers participating in training and 0 otherwise.  The reference individual is male with less 
than tertiary education, aged 20 to 49 years, with 6 to 9 years of tenure, no prior history of long term 
unemployment and working in a firm with no more than 500 employees. 
b)  Logarithm of the ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile of the cluster-specific distribution of gross hourly wages of 
male employees aged 20 to 55 years and not in education or training.  Clusters are defined over 12 countries, 2 
occupations, 2 sectors, 3 education levels and 2 age classes. 










































Table 4. Wage compression has an impact on both general and specific training 
Off-site CVT
Male*D91
b -0.268 -0.408 0.037 -1.926 ** -2.067 ** -1.653 **
Older workers
c*D91
b - - -0.076 - - -5.067 **
Female*D91
b - 0.075 - - -1.993 *** -
Age -0.035 * -0.028 * -0.044 * -0.051 * -0.058 * -0.050 *
Job tenure (0 and 1 year) 0.334 0.568 * 0.387 ** 0.607 0.669 ** 0.958 **
Job tenure (2 to 5 years) 0.031 0.013 -0.029 -0.122 0.046 0.203
Job tenure (10 to 14 years) 0.080 0.083 0.176 0.125 0.067 0.271
Job tenure (15 years or more) 0.076 -0.160 0.077 0.109 0.137 0.243
Firm size (more than 500 employees) 0.415 * 0.221 ** 0.447 * 0.453 *** 0.441 ** 0.780 *
Tertiary education 0.365 ** 0.270 ** 0.097 - - -
Long term unemployment spell -0.350 -0.383 ** -0.392 -0.793 * -0.761 * -1.352 **
Female - -0.459 - - 0.137 -
Older workers
c - - 0.091 - - 1.947
Workplace CVT
Male*D91
b -0.665 -0.337 -0.206 -2.108 * -1.919 * -2.457 *
Older workers
c*D91
b - - 0.611 - - -2.881 *
Female*D91
b - -0.073 - - -0.745 -
Age -0.028 * -0.020 * -0.022 ** -0.018 -0.018 ** -0.014
Job tenure (0 and 1 year) -0.302 -0.348 ** -0.251 -0.463 -0.147 -0.347
Job tenure (2 to 5 years) -0.210 -0.275 *** -0.150 0.389 0.067 0.528
Job tenure (10 to 14 years) 0.064 0.167 0.240 0.509 0.364 0.625 ***
Job tenure (15 years or more) 0.040 -0.090 0.083 0.191 0.359 0.387
Firm size (more than 500 employees) 0.728 * 0.605 * 0.690 * 1.079 * 1.193 * 1.261 *
Tertiary education 0.434 ** 0.391 * 0.372 ** - - -
Long term unemployment spell -0.602 * -0.416 *** -0.442 -0.290 -0.399 -0.551
Female - -0.517 - - -1.662 ** -
Older workers
c -- - 1 . 3 4 3 -- - 0 . 0 1 8
Log Likelihood -2629 -4387 -2710 -721 -1130 -716
Number of observations 5092 8413 5295 4506 7007 4891
Pseudo-R² 0.139 0.133 0.136 0.211 0.206 0.230
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 01 01 01 01 01 0







Employees with upper secondary education and above









*, **, *** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, standard errors adjusted for cluster level 
effects. 
a)  The reported coefficients show the linear effect of each variable on the unobserved propensity to receive 
training.  A positive sign for a given variable indicates that the probability of receiving training is larger the 
greater that variable.  Each equation also includes 8 occupation dummies, 13 sector dummies and 12 country 
dummies.  The sample is wage and salary employees in the private sector who are no longer in education, and 
not in the agricultural sector.  The dependent variable takes value 1 for workers participating in training and 0 
otherwise.  The reference individual is male with less than tertiary education, aged 20 to 49 years, with 6 to 9 
years of tenure, no prior history of long term unemployment and working in a firm with no more than 500 
employees. 
b)  Logarithm of  the ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile of the cluster-specific distribution of gross hourly wages of 
male employees aged 20 to 55 years and not in education or training.  Clusters are defined over 12 countries, 2 
occupations, 2 sectors, 3 education levels and 2 age classes. 
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Austria 26.9 25.2 31.2 34.5 30.3
Belgium 
c 19.2 17.2 30.8 38.9 28.9
Canada 33.6 30.2 41.4 64.3 37.4
Czech Republic 15.4 14.7 19.1 26.1 18.5
Denmark 33.3 31.1 35.4 39.1 34.6
Finland 38.1 38.9 37.2 38.6 37.0
Hungary 15.4 14.5 20.0 24.9 18.7
Ireland 19.2 17.5 29.0 29.2 29.0
Italy 24.1 21.1 34.0 36.4 32.2
Netherlands 22.5 21.7 24.6 23.9 24.7
New Zealand 33.0 28.2 40.3 48.6 38.5
Norway 34.4 29.4 39.9 30.6 41.0
Poland 16.0 14.6 25.5 36.8 22.8
Switzerland 27.2 26.6 29.7 25.3 31.4
United Kingdom 25.4 20.1 31.2 47.1 29.3
United States 26.1 21.9 34.6 43.1 33.6






Percentage of workers reporting that they wanted to take further training, but did not
Of which:
 
Note: Data refer to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking 
regions), and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of 
Switzerland. 
a)   Employed persons aged 25 to 65 years who did not receive training for professional or career-related purposes. 
b)   Employed persons aged 25 to 65 years who received training for professional or career-related purposes.   















































Women 2.3 ** -1.1 +
Age groups 
(reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 1.7 -7.5 * -
Aged 26-35 1.7 -1.0 0
Aged 46-55 -7.1 * -2.2 ** + 
Aged 56-65 -15.2 * -6.5 *+  
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -4.9 * -4.0 * 0(?)
       Tertiary 5.5 * 5.2 * 0(?)
Community size 
(reference: Urban)
Rural  -3.2 * -0.1 +
Full-time/part-time
(reference: Full-time)
Part-time workers -2.2 *** -12.4 *-  
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants 2.4 -5.5 *-
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employer)
One employer only -9.2 * 1.6 +
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees 1.2 -2.4 *** -
200 to 499 employees -0.1 5.4 * +
500 & more employees 1.0 9.9 *+
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & energy)
Construction 5.9 ** -3.9 *** -
Wholesale & retail trade 2.5 -5.1 *-
Transport, storage & communications 0.9 2.7 *** +
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services -0.9 4.8 * +
Community, social & personal services 5.4 * -0.6 -
Occupation 
(reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 1.3 11.0 *+
Professionals 5.8 * 5.2 *?
Technicians & associate professionals 3.6 ** 5.6 * ?
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -1.6 -3.3 ** -
Craft & related trades workers -2.6 -6.0 *-
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -2.5 -11.4 *-
Elementary occupations -7.9 * -17.6 * - 
Predicted at vector 0 34.4 34.6
Log likelihood -6912 -11129
Number of observations 11929 19036
Number of countries 15 15
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.115
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*, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
a)  The estimation is based on the hypothesis that employees cannot refuse to be trained.  Subject to this 
hypothesis, the demand equation is estimated only on the sub-sample of those who did not receive employer-
sponsored training. 
b)  Estimated percentage change in the probability of demanding training (receiving training in equilibrium) with 
respect to the reference individual.  Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming no correlation 
between residuals.  The sample population is employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least 
some education, aged 16 to 65 years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is 
indicated in the table.  The dependent variable for demand takes value 1 if the individual received training or 
wished to be trained.  For the equilibrium outcome the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual 
received employer-sponsored training.  All equations include 15 country dummies.  
c)  +, - and 0 mean that, with respect to the reference individual, a given characteristic is estimated to increase 
supply, reduce supply, leave supply unchanged. The sign ? implies that nothing can be said on the supply shift. 
See Annex 1 for a detailed description.  









































  Table 7. Literacy has no impact on training demand 
Supply
 c
Literacy 0.5 5.0 ** +
Number of countries 5 5
Bivariate probit estimates
  a, b
Supply and demand: the effect of literacy
Demand Equilibrium outcome
 
  *, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively . 
a)  The estimation is based on the hypothesis that employees cannot refuse to be trained.  Subject to this 
hypothesis, the demand equation is estimated only on the sub-sample of those who did not receive employer-
sponsored training.  
b)  Estimated percentage change in the probability of demanding training (receiving training in equilibrium) with 
respect to the reference individual.  For literacy, which is a continuous variable, the effect of a 10% increase in 
the literacy score from the sample average is reported.  Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood 
assuming no correlation between residuals.  Literacy, being potentially endogenous, has been instrumented 
using parental background characteristics, education, gender, age, community size, country of birth and country 
dummies.  The sample are employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least some education, 
aged 16 to 65 years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is a native male 
employee aged 36 to 45, with upper secondary education, who has changed job in the last 12 months and is 
working full-time as a clerk in a firm with 100 to 199 employees, located in an urban area and whose main 
business is in the mining, manufacturing or energy industry.   The dependent variable for demand takes 1 if the 
individual received training or wished to be trained.  For the equilibrium outcome the dependent variable takes 
value 1 if the individual received employer-sponsored training.  All equations include dummies for gender, 
educational attainment, age classes, community size, part-time status, country of birth, number of employees, 
firm size classes, industries, occupations and countries.   
c)  +, - and 0 mean that, with respect to the reference individual, a given characteristic is estimated to increase 
supply, reduce supply, leave supply unchanged. The sign ? implies that nothing can be said on the supply shift. 
See Annex 1 for a detailed description.  
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  -family and health problems -1.7   -9.7 * - -3.9   -6.2 * - -6.2 *** -5.8 ** ?
  -still in education -7.5 * -19.9 * -  -10.2 ** -17.3 * - (?) -12.1 * -16.4 * ?
-12.1 * -8.6 * ? -11.3 * -7.9 ** ? -12.2 * -7.3 ** ?
  -involuntary part-time 8.5 * -13.3 * - 1.1   -12.1 * - -0.6   -9.0 * -
Supervisory role
(reference: some supervisory role)
No supervisory -6.6 * -8.5 * ? -6.5 * -7.5 * ?
Great supervisory -4.3 *** 4.7 * + -3.4   5.0 * +
Temporary contract
(reference:  permanent)
Temporary contract 7.8 * -12.7 * -












  -voluntary part-time for other reasons
 
  *, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively . 
a)  The estimation is based on the hypothesis that employees cannot refuse to be trained.  Subject to this 
hypothesis, the demand equation is estimated only on the sub-sample of those who did not receive employer-
sponsored training.   
b)  Estimated percentage change in the probability of demanding training (receiving training in equilibrium) with 
respect to the reference individual.  Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming no correlation 
between residuals.  The sample are employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least some 
education, aged 16 to 65 years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is a native 
male employee aged 36 to 45, with upper secondary education, who has changed job in the last 12 months and 
is working full-time as a clerk in a firm with 100 to 199 employees, located in an urban area and whose main 
business is in the mining, manufacturing or energy industry.  Additional characteristics of the reference 
individual are indicated in the table.  The dependent variable for demand takes value 1 if the individual received 
training or wished to be trained.  For the equilibrium outcome the dependent variable takes value 1 if the 
individual received employer-sponsored training. All equations include dummies for gender, age classes, 
community size, part-time status, country of birth, number of employees, firm size classes, industries, 
occupations and countries. 
c)  +, - and 0 mean that, with respect to the reference individual, a given characteristic is estimated to increase 
supply, reduce supply, leave supply unchanged. The sign ? implies that nothing can be said on the supply shift. 
See Annex 1 for a detailed description. 









































Table 9. From evidence to policy 
Disadvantaged group
Older workers, low-educated workers
Low literacy workers with low 
qualifications
 Main co-financing policy options likely to improve training outcomes for specific 
disadvantaged groups
 - Reducing individual credit 
constraints (loan schemes, ILAs, pay-
back clauses)
Women, immigrants, workers with 
low literacy, involuntary part-time 
workers, temporary workers, non-
supervisory workers
Low supply due to 
individual 
characteristics
Main barrier to training 
a
Weak demand with equal or higher 
employers' supply
 - Incentives for employers (corporate 
tax deductions, pay-back clauses)
Co-financing schemes
 - Reducing individual credit 
constraints (loan schemes, ILAs, pay-
back clauses)
 - Incentives for employers (targeted 
tax deductions, pay-back clauses)
Low supply due to 
firm characteristics
Workers in small firms, workers in 
low-tech industries and/or industry 
with many firms
Low employers' 
supply with equal 
or higher demand
 - Reducing individual time constraints 
(time accounts, training leave)
 - Improving cost-sharing (pay-back 
clauses)




a)      Barriers to training refer to the main reasons for the weak participation in employer-sponsored CVT of a 
particular worker group relative to the reference group, namely native, high-skilled, full-time, prime-age male 
employees in large high-tech firms. 
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 Chart 1.   Older workers and women receive less training 






















































a)   Data refer to employed persons aged 26 to 65 years. 
b)   Unweighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
c)   Ratio of employees participating in training to total employees (in %).  










































Chart 2.   Native and skilled workers receive more training 
Employer-sponsored CVT courses by socio-economic characteristics
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Participation rate 
c
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%
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a)   Data refer to employed persons aged 26 to 65 years. 
b)   Unweighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  Belgium is excluded from 'Occupation'; Australia, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and 
Norway are excluded from 'Responsibility in work' due to missing data; Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Hungary and Poland are excluded from 'Country of birth'.  
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Chart 3. Most training is entirely paid by employers 
































a)   Data refer to all CVT courses (both employer-sponsored and non-employer-sponsored) received by employed 
persons aged 26 to 65 years and to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-
speaking regions), and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-
speaking regions of Switzerland. 
b)   Unweighted average of countries shown. 










































Chart 4.   Employer-paid CVT less frequently impart firm-specific skills 


























a)   Data refer to CVT courses that are entirely employer-paid and provided to employed persons aged 26 to 65 
years. Also, they refer to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking 
regions), and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-
speaking regions of Switzerland. 
b)   Unweighted average of countries shown. 
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Chart 5.  Workers with better literacy skills receive more training












Upper-secondary education Tertiary education
Non-participants Participants
 
a)   Data refer to employed persons aged 26 to 65 years. 
b)   Unweighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  The literacy levels are calculated as an average over the three types of literacy skills 










































Chart 6. Time is the most common constraint 
Percentage of constrained workers, by reason
 a, b 
Trained 
c
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0
Not trained 
d
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Too busy/lack of time





Lack of employer support







a)   Employed persons aged 26 to 65 years. 
b)   Unweighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
c)   Individuals who received training for professional or career-related purposes.   
d)   Individuals who did not receive training for professional or career-related purposes. 
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Chart 7. Constraints vary across worker groups   
Probability of reporting a specific constraint, conditional to being "constrained"
 a 
Cost constraint 




Managers versus elementary occupations 
Gender and part-time




0 10 20 30 40 0 1 02 03 04 0
Women
Full-time
Women, part-time due to 
family reasons







a)   See Annex 2 for full estimation results. 
b)   Too busy/lack of time, too busy at work, family responsibilities, course offered at inconvenient time. 
c)   Course too expensive/no money. 










































Table A1.1. Samples and dependent variables  
Whole sample
Hypothesis B: Employers can always 
force a worker to be trained through 
monetary compensation or lay-off threats
Non-participants in sponsored CVT
Participants in sponsored and non-




Dependent variable: 1 for participants 
in sponsored and non-sponsored CVT 
or constrained workers, and 0 for the 
others
Dependent variable: 1 for participants 
in sponsored CVT only, and 0 for the 
others
Hypothesis A:  Employers cannot force 
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depends on the relative 
size of differences
--
depends on the relative 
size of differences  
a)   +, - and 0 mean that, with respect to the reference individual, a given characteristic is estimated to shift the 
corresponding curve rightward, leftward and in no significant way, respectively.  For example, the first line of the 
table means that if demand is estimated to shift rightward and no significant shift is estimated for the equilibrium 













































Men Women 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Both 
sexes
Men Women 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Australia 24.4 25.8 22.4 24.8 27.8 21.9 17.5 15.4 19.5 9.9 19.0 14.8 14.1 8.6
Belgium
b 13.2 14.7 10.7 12.0 11.3 17.1 18.2 9.7 12.0 6.1 11.7 6.8 8.7 20.9
Canada 28.3 28.8 27.6 27.3 29.2 29.9 23.4 17.3 21.8 11.5 15.3 19.2 19.1 13.4
Czech Republic 15.9 19.3 12.0 19.1 15.1 14.8 14.4 13.3 15.9 10.3 18.3 10.3 13.6 10.8
Denmark 44.8 43.3 46.6 46.6 49.9 42.8 32.2 36.4 34.0 39.3 35.7 37.7 39.6 26.4
Finland 41.7 41.7 41.9 44.7 44.3 38.1 33.5 22.6 22.7 22.6 28.0 25.8 16.4 13.5
Hungary 13.6 13.0 14.4 15.2 14.0 12.2 9.0 13.0 12.3 13.8 15.1 14.4 9.8 7.4
Ireland 10.2 8.7 12.9 13.1 10.1 7.4 4.9 8.7 4.6 16.4 13.1 8.7 3.5 2.6
Italy 14.0 16.4 9.7 14.8 15.1 11.6 12.9 7.7 8.1 7.0 10.6 7.3 5.4 4.2
Netherlands 24.1 26.9 19.4 25.2 27.0 21.3 14.6 21.4 25.0 15.3 29.4 19.6 15.3 10.2
New Zealand 33.7 34.3 33.0 33.9 36.5 35.8 19.3 23.2 28.0 17.5 26.4 22.4 22.5 17.7
Norway 44.9 42.3 48.1 48.0 46.7 45.0 30.5 35.0 34.8 35.1 38.9 37.4 31.4 25.1
Poland 10.6 9.5 12.1 10.3 11.8 9.1 9.5 8.0 7.3 8.9 10.1 7.1 7.1 4.9
Switzerland 14.5 15.7 12.6 16.8 14.6 12.3 12.7 8.8 10.8 5.9 12.9 10.0 5.2 3.5
United Kindgom 43.5 43.3 43.8 48.1 48.8 37.3 30.0 21.8 24.5 18.4 27.1 24.1 18.5 7.8
United States 32.7 31.7 33.7 32.9 34.5 31.8 29.1 18.3 22.2 14.0 21.8 22.1 13.0 10.8
Age group
 Participation in employer-sponsored training (%) Hours spent in employer-sponsored training per employee
Gender Gender Age group
 
a)  Data refer to employed persons aged 26 to 65 years and to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium 
(Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of Switzerland. 
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Upper secondary Tertiary Natives Immigrants
Employee 
(no supervisory)
Australia 34.1 21.2 13.6 18.2 23.0 32.9 26.3 19.6 . .
Belgium
b 33.7 11.5 .. 5.5 13.6 22.1 13.2 .. 9.2
Canada 37.6 24.8 14.9 16.3 23.5 38.2 28.0 29.4 21.2
Czech Republic 22.3 12.8 10.0 11.2 19.5 26.2 16.0 .. 13.8
Denmark 58.9 38.9 21.6 27.5 42.2 59.4 45.0 34.0 . .
Finland 52.6 38.0 20.1 28.6 39.7 57.3 41.9 .. 42.6
Hungary 23.2 10.0 5.7 8.4 9.6 26.3 13.7 .. 12.7
Ireland 15.2 10.3 4.7 6.3 13.4 13.8 10.3 8.1 . .
Italy 23.4 12.1 4.9 7.3 19.5 23.0 13.9 16.6 12.4
Netherlands 28.7 20.2 13.3 15.0 23.9 37.3 23.9 27.4 21.2
New Zealand 45.8 30.8 20.8 27.9 30.5 44.6 35.0 28.7 . .
Norway 55.5 40.7 24.9 27.2 42.0 56.1 45.2 39.5 . .
Poland 20.6 9.4 3.1 4.7 16.0 20.3 10.7 .. 9.7
Switzerland 19.9 12.0 6.1 4.6 15.6 22.7 16.0 8.7 11.9
United Kingdom 55.7 38.0 27.7 35.2 48.2 58.0 43.8 39.8 41.5









Upper secondary Tertiary Natives Immigrants
Employee 
(no supervisory)
Australia 18.0 13.8 10.1 11.4 15.3 20.1 15.3 15.6 . .
Belgium 21.9 7.8 .. 3.0 13.1 14.2 9.9 .. 6.0
Canada 19.5 15.9 15.1 12.0 13.1 23.8 17.1 18.3 10.6
Czech Republic 19.6 10.3 6.9 8.0 16.4 27.2 13.5 .. 11.9
Denmark 48.8 31.0 19.9 29.4 32.2 47.3 36.7 22.7 . .
Finland 30.8 18.2 6.9 13.1 21.9 32.4 22.7 .. 21.7
Hungary 28.6 6.5 2.2 4.5 10.0 26.9 13.1 .. 11.6
Ireland 13.0 10.7 1.7 7.8 10.9 6.5 9.0 2.5 . .
Italy 15.5 5.3 1.8 2.8 12.5 12.5 7.7 9.4 5.2
Netherlands 26.6 13.9 14.3 14.4 23.4 28.3 21.1 26.6 19.6
New Zealand 32.1 17.4 18.6 24.4 20.3 23.3 23.7 21.1 . .
Norway 43.9 25.4 28.5 21.6 34.6 39.7 35.6 24.2 . .
Poland 11.5 10.9 2.0 5.3 8.6 14.7 8.0 .. 7.5
Switzerland 11.8 9.1 2.0 1.4 10.2 13.9 10.3 3.5 7.2
United Kingdom 27.5 19.6 12.9 18.0 27.2 25.7 21.9 20.7 22.9
United States 22.7 17.1 10.9 7.6 12.8 26.5 18.9 13.8 12.6
Educational attainment Country of birth
Hours spent in employer-sponsored training per employee
Occupation
Participation in employer-sponsored training (%)
Occupation Educational attainment Country of birth
 
. .  Data not available or cells with less than 30 observations. 
a)  Data refer to employed persons aged 26 to 65 years and to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium 
(Flanders only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of Switzerland. 










































Table A2.3. Probit and tobit estimates of the determinants of training   
Gender 
(reference: Men)
Women -0.011 -0.205 *
Age groups 
(reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -0.076 * -0.683 *
Aged 26-35 -0.010 -0.070
Aged 46-55 -0.022 ** -0.231 **
Aged 56-65 -0.065 * -0.711 *
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -0.040 * -0.389 *






Part-time workers -0.124 * -1.414 *
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants -0.055 * -0.500 *
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employee)
One employer only 0.016 0.092
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees -0.024 *** -0.335 **
200 to 499 employees 0.053 * 0.433 *
500 & more employees 0.099 * 0.847 *
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction -0.039 *** -0.488 **
Wholesale & retail trade -0.051 * -0.572 *
Transport, storage & communications 0.027 *** 0.283 **
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services 0.048 * 0.341 *
Community, social & personal services -0.006 -0.104
Occupation 
(reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 0.110 * 1.059 *
Professionals 0.053 * 0.529 *
Technicians & associate professionals 0.056 * 0.549 *
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -0.033 ** -0.299
Craft & related trades workers -0.059 * -0.501 *
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -0.113 * -1.181 *
Elementary occupations -0.176 * -2.067 *
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      Belgium
c -0.162 * -2.418 *
      Canada -0.035 ** -0.366 **
      Czech Republic -0.180 * -2.063 *
      Denmark 0.180 * 1.591 *
      Finland 0.132 * 0.990 *
      Hungary -0.197 * -2.454 *
      Ireland -0.202 * -2.907 *
      Italy -0.166 * -1.888 *
      New Zealand 0.137 * 1.056 *
      Norway 0.128 * 1.113 *
      Poland -0.189 * -2.889 *
      Switzerland -0.112 * -1.194 *
      United Kingdom 0.148 * 1.048 *
      United States -0.017 -0.262
Predicted at vector 0 0.345 -0.830
Log likelihood -11138 3043
Number of observations 19062 18853
Number of countries 15 15
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.057






*, **, ***,  statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.           
a)  Estimated change in the probability of training participation with respect to the reference individual.  The sample 
population is employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least some education, aged 16 to 65 
years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is indicated in the table.    
b)  The dependent variable is equal to  log (1+T) where T stands for hours of training.  
c) Flanders  only.   









































Table A2.4. Training supply and demand: the effect of literacy 
Literacy 3.7 4.0 0.5 5.0 **
Mother has worked 6.6 * -0.5   5.2 ** 3.4 ***
Gender 
(reference: Men)
Women -0.3  -5.1 * 1.8   -3.1 **
Age groups 
(reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -6.7 * -9.7 * -0.4   -9.6 *
Aged 26-35 -0.5   -3.7 ** 1.9   -2.8 ***
Aged 46-55 -6.9 * 3.7 *** -6.2 * -2.2  
Aged 56-65 -9.5 * 8.7 ** -10.2 * -0.6  
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -2.7   1.6   -3.4   0.1  
       Tertiary 3.2   -5.1 *** 5.5 ** -1.6  
Community size 
(reference: Urban)
Rural -0.2   0.4   -0.9   0.6  
Full-time/part-time
(reference: Full-time)
Part-time workers -8.8 * -15.8 * -0.5   -13.2 *
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants 1.6  -3.0   3.0   -0.6  
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employer)
One employer only -5.4 * 5.3 * -6.7 * 1.6  
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees 3.3   -3.6   3.6   -0.1  
200 to 499 employees 4.6   8.4 * -1.8   9.7 *
500 & more employees 10.3 * 7.0 * 3.1   12.2 *
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction -0.3  -14.0 * 6.5 *** -8.2 **
Wholesale & retail trade 0.0   -9.5 * 5.2 ** -5.7 **
Transport, storage & communications 4.0   2.0   2.6   2.9  
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services 3.8   -0.7   3.3   1.9  
Community, social & personal services 4.6 ** -7.6 * 7.6 * -1.9  
Occupation 
(reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 5.8 ** 4.2   1.8   6.1 **
Professionals 5.6 ** 1.7  3.4   4.3 **
Technicians & associate professionals 6.1 * -0.5   5.8 ** 2.7  
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -3.4   -7.3 ** 0.7   -6.2 *
Craft & related trades workers 0.2   -12.7 * 5.5 *** -6.9 *
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -10.5 * -16.1 * -0.3   -14.1 *
Elementary occupations -14.0 * -20.4 * -2.6   -17.8 *
Predicted value at the average literacy score
d 48.3 72.3 22.5 34.0
Average literacy score 294.4 298.0 291.3 294.4
Number of observations 6973 4141 4437 6973
Log likelihood -4407.6054 -2530.0355 -2759.9307 -4185.3041
Number of countries 5 5 5 5
Pseudo-R² 0.0641 0.0849 0.0495 0.0844
Equilibrium outcome Demand Demand Equilibrium outcome
Hypothesis B 
c
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*, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and  10%  levels,  respectively.          
a)  Estimated change in the probability of demanding training (receiving training in equilibrium) with respect to the 
reference individual.  For literacy, which is a continuous variable, the effect of a 10% increase in the literacy 
score from the sample average is reported.  Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming no 
correlation between residuals.  Literacy, being potentially endogenous, has been instrumented using parental 
background characteristics, education, gender, age, community size, country of birth and country dummies.   
The sample population is employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least some education, aged 
16 to 65 years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is indicated in the table.  The 
dependent variable for demand takes value 1 if the individual received training or wished to be trained.  For the 
equilibrium outcome the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual received employer-sponsored 
training.  All equations include 15 country dummies.  
b)   Employees can refuse to be trained.  Subject to this hypothesis, the equilibrium outcome equation is estimated 
only on the sub-sample of those wishing to receive training.   
c)  Employees cannot refuse to be trained.  Subject to this hypothesis, the demand equation is estimated only on 
the sub-sample of those who did not receive employer-sponsored training. 
d)  Predicted probability at the average literacy score for the reference individual.  









































Table A2.5.  Training demand and supply according to the type of contract 
Part-time (reference: Full-time worker)
Family and health reasons -8.68 * -10.12 * -1.74 -9.65 *
Still in education -19.20 * -24.50 * -7.46 * -19.92 *
Voluntary part-time for other reasons -14.45 * -0.17 -12.05 * -8.55 *
Involuntary part-times -2.17 -22.52 * 8.45 * -13.30
Gender (reference: Men)
Women 0.49 -4.32 * 2.53 ** -1.65 **
Age groups (reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -2.01 -8.66 * 2.73 -5.49 *
Aged 26-35 0.61 -1.93 1.71 -0.74
Aged 46-55 -5.75 * 3.13 ** -7.13 * -2.12 **
Aged 56-65 -13.79 * 4.32 ** -15.16 * -6.48 *
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -5.92 * -0.79 -4.91 * -4.07 *
       Tertiary 6.55 * 2.06 5.38 * 5.16 *
Community size (reference: Urban)
Rural -2.26 ** 2.35 *** -3.66 * -0.18
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants -2.43 *** -7.83 * 2.25 -5.29 *
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employee)
One employer only -5.35 * 6.92 * -9.62 * 1.29
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees -0.59 -3.69 *** 1.83 -2.46 ***
200 to 499 employees 4.05 ** 5.55 ** 0.76 5.57 *
500 & more employees 7.51 * 8.79 * 1.80 9.89 *
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction 1.33 -8.97 * 6.42 ** -3.84 ***
Wholesale & retail trade -1.64 -5.91 * 2.84 -4.31 *
Transport, storage & communications 2.08 3.41 ** 0.80 2.52 ***
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services 2.42 5.54 * -1.18 4.39 *
Community, social & personal services 2.76 ** -4.21 ** 5.33 * -0.57
Occupation (reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 8.49 * 9.57 * 1.24 10.74 *
Professionals 7.08 * 1.62 6.43 * 5.11 *
Technicians & associate professionals 5.55 * 3.62 *** 3.72 ** 5.24 *
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -3.23 ** -2.00 -1.95 -2.92 **
Craft & related trades workers -5.53 * -5.10 ** -2.88 -5.82 *
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -9.96 * -12.56 * -3.03 -10.99 *
Elementary occupations -18.12 * -16.00 * -8.75 * -16.52 *
Predicted at vector 0 58.75 55.10 39.91 31.48
Log likelihood -11591 -6200 -6799 -10990
Number of observations 18811 10709 11763 18811
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 51 51 51 5
Pseudo R
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Table A2.5.  Training demand and supply according to the type of contract 
(cont.) 
Part-time (reference: Full-time worker)
Family and health reasons -6.94 * -3.42 -3.95 -6.22 *
Still in education -17.19 * -17.74 * -10.21 ** -17.30 *
Voluntary part-time for other reasons -12.36 * -0.24 -11.33 * -7.86 **
Involuntary part-times -4.83 -17.14 * 1.14 -12.08 *
Supervisory role (reference: some supervisory role)
No supervisory -9.20 * -5.81 * -6.63 * -8.52 *
Great supervisory 1.28 5.98 ** -4.29 *** 4.75 *
Gender (reference: Men)
Women 0.67 -5.22 * 2.85 *** -2.00 ***
Age groups (reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -1.38 -6.20 ** 2.04 -4.17 **
Aged 26-35 1.61 -1.25 2.20 0.22
Aged 46-55 -5.14 * 2.78 -6.80 * -2.40 ***
Aged 56-65 -10.41 * 6.17 *** -14.87 * -4.23 **
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -6.21 * -1.40 -5.10 * -5.29 *
       Tertiary 6.64 * -0.38 7.48 * 4.34 *
Community size (reference: Urban)
Rural -1.10 1.16 -1.59 -0.28
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants -3.01 -6.80 ** 0.10 -5.58 *
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employee)
One employer only -7.61 * 7.74 * -12.74 * 0.23
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees 0.77 -3.98 3.23 -1.77
200 to 499 employees 3.13 8.16 * -0.65 6.93 *
500 & more employees 8.01 * 9.79 * 2.58 11.93 *
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction 2.01 -4.18 5.02 -1.51
Wholesale & retail trade -1.38 -7.16 ** 4.22 -5.17 *
Transport, storage & communications 4.85 ** 6.97 ** 1.96 6.77 *
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services 5.52 * 3.55 4.28 5.81 *
Community, social & personal services 2.65 *** -6.13 * 6.83 * -1.79
Occupation (reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 1.97 3.81 -1.07 3.26
Professionals 6.36 * 0.00 7.81 * 4.02 **
Technicians & associate professionals 4.48 * 0.74 5.09 ** 3.15 ***
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -5.87 * -1.54 -4.39 *** -5.12 *
Craft & related trades workers -8.20 * -6.31 ** -5.29 *** -8.70 *
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -11.84 * -9.39 * -7.05 ** -11.91 *
Elementary occupations -18.98 * -15.97 * -10.27 * -18.54 *
Predicted at vector 0 65.43 57.92 45.77 36.96
Log likelihood -6730 -3409 -3943 -6197
Number of observations 11043 5909 7228 11043
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 01 01 01 0
Pseudo R





b Hypothesis B 
c










































Table A2.5.  Training demand and supply according to the type of contract 
(cont.) 
Part-time (reference: Full-time worker)
Family and health reasons -8.38 * -1.91 -6.16 *** -5.75 **
Still in education -18.27 * -16.77 * -12.10 * -16.37 *
Voluntary part-time for other reasons -13.31 * 0.27 -12.16 * -7.27 **
Involuntary part-times -4.34 -12.86 * -0.61 -8.98 *
Supervisory role (reference: some supervisory role)
No supervisory -8.85 * -4.88 ** -6.47 * -7.51 *
Great supervisory 2.05 5.91 ** -3.45 5.00 *
Temporary contract (reference: permanent)
           Temporary contract -1.95 -18.64 * 7.85 * -12.67 *
Gender (reference: Men)
Women 1.62 -4.60 * 3.49 ** -1.22
Age groups (reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -0.30 -4.10 2.11 -2.14
Aged 26-35 1.60 -1.29 2.28 0.08
Aged 46-55 -6.68 * 1.01 -7.00 * -4.01 *
Aged 56-65 -10.09 * 4.75 -13.46 * -4.27 ***
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary -6.25 * -1.46 -4.93 ** -5.09 *
       Tertiary 6.66 * -0.21 7.05 * 4.16 *
Community size (reference: Urban)
Rural -1.71 1.26 -2.67 *** -0.27
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants -2.90 -6.17 ** 0.17 -4.96 **
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employee)
One employer only -7.42 * 5.49 ** -11.27 * -1.07
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees 2.20 -2.37 3.56 0.06
200 to 499 employees 4.71 ** 8.21 ** 1.04 7.99 *
500 & more employees 9.67 * 11.73 * 2.72 14.07 *
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction 1.80 -3.15 3.97 -1.55
Wholesale & retail trade -0.44 -5.50 *** 4.03 -3.72 ***
Transport, storage & communications 4.98 ** 7.44 ** 1.85 6.77 *
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services 7.67 * 5.31 *** 5.16 *** 8.00 *
Community, social & personal services 4.14 * -4.27 *** 7.12 * 0.04
Occupation (reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 1.52 4.66 -2.76 3.50
Professionals 6.93 * 1.71 6.61 ** 5.35 *
Technicians & associate professionals 4.74 * 0.02 5.72 ** 2.71
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -6.01 * -2.76 -3.98 -5.39 *
Craft & related trades workers -7.71 * -5.51 -5.57 *** -7.51 *
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -11.10 * -9.55 * -6.50 ** -10.83 *
Elementary occupations -18.41 * -15.05 * -10.19 * -17.31 *
Predicted at vector 0 62.24 56.97 43.65 34.61
Log likelihood -5861 -3062 -3432 -5491
Number of observations 9623 5412 6099 9623
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 8888
Pseudo R
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*, **, ***,  statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
a)  Estimated change in the probability of demanding training (receiving training in equilibrium) with respect to the 
reference individual.  Equations are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming no correlation between 
residuals.  The sample are employees of firms with more than 20 employees, with at least some education, 
aged 16 to 65 years and not working in the agricultural sector.  The reference individual is indicated in the table.  
Additional characteristics of the reference individual are indicated in the table.  The dependent variable for 
demand takes value 1 if the individual received training or wished to be trained.  For the equilibrium outcome 
the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual received employer-sponsored training. All equations 
include country dummies.   
b)  Employees can refuse to be trained.  Subject to this hypothesis, the equilibrium outcome equation is estimated 
only on the sub-sample of those wishing to receive training.   
c)  Employees cannot refuse to be trained.  Subject to this hypothesis, the demand equation is estimated only on 
the sub-sample of those who did not receive employer-sponsored training. 









































Table A2.6. Probability of selected barriers to training conditional on being constrained 
Training participation (reference:non-trained)
Trained without employer-sponsoring 4.67 -5.44 -3.03
Trained with employer-sponsoring -2.89 0.30 -0.54
Training intensity (reference: average level)
1+log of time spent in training courses -1.00 3.58 ** 0.96
    (not employer-sponsored)
1+log of time spent in training courses 1.13 0.09 -0.14
    (employer-sponsored)
Part-time (reference: Full-time worker)
Family and health reasons 5.73 ** 4.95 *** 15.49 *
Voluntary part-time for other reasons -2.76 -3.86 -1.51
Involuntary part-time -15.65 * 7.22 ** -2.66 **
Gender (reference: Men)
Women 0.94 7.58 * 7.27 *
Age groups (reference: aged 36-45)
Aged 16-25 -5.32 ** 1.40 -3.97 *
Aged 26-35 2.64 0.66 2.07 *
Aged 46-55 0.28 -5.34 * -2.68 *
Aged 56-65 -7.00 ** -4.53 -3.90 *
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary)
       Less than upper secondary 0.37 -2.60 -0.72
       Tertiary 4.05 ** 1.62 -0.77
Community size (reference: Urban)
Rural 3.71 ** -2.38 0.80
Country of birth
(reference: born in country of interview)
Immigrants 5.03 ** -0.64 1.08
Number of employers (last 12 months)
(references: more than one employee)
One employer only 3.84 ** -7.69 * 0.49
Firm size 
(reference: 100 to 199 employees)
20 to 99 employees -5.63 ** -0.08 -1.41
200 to 499 employees -5.80 *** -0.79 -0.82
500 & more employees -9.20 * -3.76 *** -1.29
Industry 
(reference: manufacturing, mining & electricity)
Construction 1.49 -1.63 -2.30
Wholesale & retail trade 1.15 7.81 * 1.85
Transport, storage & communications -4.93 1.33 -0.21
Financing, Ins. Real estate & Bus. Services -1.37 0.15 0.54
Community, social & personal services -9.77 * 8.10 * 0.27
Occupation (reference: Clerks)
Legislators, senior officials & managers 9.29 * -3.83 -2.21 **
Professionals 6.35 * 2.80 1.01
Technicians & associate professionals 0.29 1.22 -1.25
Service workers & shop & market sales workers -2.01 -0.30 0.22
Craft & related trades workers -10.15 * -3.09 1.39
Plant & machine operators & assemblers -7.59 ** 0.38 1.62
Elementary occupations -9.72 ** 6.66 *** 1.02 *
Cost constraints 
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Table A2.6.  Probability of selected barriers to training conditional on being constrained 
(cont.) 
Country (reference: Australia)
      Canada 6.47 ** 1.32 7.16 *
      Denmark -11.34 * -14.25 * -1.66
      Finland -3.71 -6.09 ** 1.29
      Italy 9.95 * -11.18 * 9.16 *
      New Zealand 11.97 * 9.71 * 17.14 *
      Norway -5.00 *** -9.02 * 1.11
      Switzerland 1.82 -12.52 * 0.23
      United Kingdom -4.17 -1.94 2.42 ***
      United States 8.37 ** 10.44 * 8.44 *
Log likelihood -3091 -2340 -1515
Number of observations 4866 4868 4867
Number of countries 10 10 10
Pseudo R





b Cost constraints 
c
 
*, **, ***,  statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
a)  "Estimated change in the probability of being affected by the particular type of constraint conditional to being 
""constrained"" with respect to the reference individual. For continuous variables, marginal changes evaluated 
at the sample mean are reported. The sample are ""constrained"" employees of firms with more than 20 
employees, with at least some education, aged 16 to 65 years and not working in agricultural sector. The 
reference individual is indicated in the table. Due to the small number of observations for some countries, only 
10 countries are included in the sample. " 
b)  Too busy/lack of time, too busy at work, family responsibilities, course offered at inconvenient time.  
c)  Course too expensive/no money. 









































Chart A1.1. Demand and supply of training: solving the identification problem 
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